THE NEAR-MISS EXPERIENCE: ORGANIZATION CHANGE IN THE MARITIME BRIDGE-WATCH by DOUWSMA, DOWARD G.
THE UNION INSTITUTE 
THE NEAR-MISS EXPERIENCE: 
ORGANIZATION CHANGE IN THE MARITIME BRIDGE-WATCH 
A PROJECT DEMONSTRATING EXCELLENCE 
SUBMfi"I'ED TO 
THE COMMI'ITEE 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
BY 
DOWARD G. DOUWSMA 
CINCINNATI, OHIO 
JUNE 1991 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes twenty-seven near-miss experiences by ten 
merchant marine officers on the U.S. Great Lakes. The experiences are 
related in the first person and include actions by self, other bridge watch 
members, and other vessels. The focus of the work is on the relationship 
between the near-miss experience and the organizational implications 
related to those experiences. 
The survey of the literature defines the near-miss experience and 
two major previous efforts to obtain and record maritime near-misses. 
The conceptual context places the near-miss in the traditional maritime 
organization which is defined through analysis of boundary and environ-
ment, horizontal and vertical differentiation, integration, conflict reso-
lution, information generation, and reward structures. The conceptual 
context also describes three alternative perspectives of organization; 
systemic, social-political and architectural. 
The thesis is exploratory in nature: how and why the near-miss 
occurred and remained a near-miss rather than becoming an accident. 
Five propositions relating to anticipated changes in the organization 
structure are used as the basis for case-study analysis. These propositions 
relate to the changing of the organization structure by one or more persons 
on the bridge watch. The propositions are supported by about one-fifth of 
the related experiences. An additional proposition is also supported by 
about one-fifth of the related experiences. 
Recommendations include the continued collection and codification 
of near-miss experiences, experimentation using full-mission simulation, 
and research into the potential for near-misses under the one-person bridge 
organization structure. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
This Project Demonstrating Excellence is about the relationship 
between the near-miss experience in the maritime environment and the 
organizational implications related to those experiences. The near-miss 
may be a universal experience in the maritime industry (Drager 1980, 20). 
Near-miss stories are the fodder for casual conversation and the substance 
for personal learning. Every mariner remembers near-misses in which he 
was an active player, a participant, or an observer and "what happened 
might be more objectively remembered" (Drager 1979, 13). The near-miss 
encompasses the range of maritime casualties: collisions, groundings, 
strandings, fire, rammings, etc. 
The near-miss has been the subject of some research. In 1979-1981 
Det norske Veritas included the near-miss experience in its ground-
breaking study Cause Relationships of Collisions and Groundings (Drager 
and others 1980, Drager 1979, Drager 1980, Drager 1981). In 1985-86 the 
United States Department of Transportation included near-miss research 
in its experimental maritime safety reporting program (U. S. Department 
of Transportation 1986). The purpose of both projects was to reduce or 
prevent groundings, collisions, contact damage, and so forth, within the 
marine environment. The Det norske Veritas final report, in describing its 
work in the near-miss experience said, "The number of near-misses at sea 
is not generally known, but on the basis of comments from ship masters 
and navigators it is presumed that a certain number of situations arise that 
could lead to collisions and groundings. These near-misses represent a 
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valuable base of empirical data, from which worthwhile knowledge can be 
gained as to how the casualty was avoided, or information about hazardous 
areas of fairway, or inadequate marking of the area, etc .. The project's 
initiative of introducing a general reporting form for near-misses was met 
with a large amount of skepticism from the navigators, and the original 
aim of this sub-task has not been realized" (Drager 1979, 31). 
The United States Department of Transportation, Marine Safety 
Reporting Program 1984-86 was designed to solicit anonymous observations 
of unsafe situations or unsafe acts in US waters. The response rate of 221 
(during the course of program) was less than half of the expected and 
desired rate of 500. The final report (29) says, "Comparatively few of the 
reports dealt with internally-induced threats to safety--that is, cases in 
which a vessel's operation breached some defined 'safe operating envelope' 
and in which the actions or inactions of the reporter were a significant 
factor in that breach." Rather, the reports pointed to situations external to 
the reporter and/or his/her operations but generally viewed as hazardous. 
Examples would be: recurring reckless pleasure-boat operation in a 
particular harbor, floating debris in the vicinity of a specific drilling rig, or 
the ambiguity of an individual navigation aid. The results with regard to 
categories of reported hazards fell far short of one MSRP objective, which 
was to stimulate self-reporting and/or reports pertaining to deficiencies in 
performance by the personnel involved. 
Thus, the two precedent major studies conclude that there is a 
skepticism or reluctance to report near-miss situations, at least to an 
official or quasi-official body. There seems to be agreement in these studies 
that the near-miss experience might be a source of professional learning 
within the international maritime community. 
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The Det norske Veritas summary analysis (Drager 1980, 35) showed 
that human error was a significant causal factor in between 75% and 85% 
of the accidents analyzed. This analysis of 27 42 collisions and grounding 
accidents and their causes was, and continues to be, the primary source of 
data in the field today. 
The United States Coast Guard marine investigation division 
analysis methodology lists 176 possible causes for maritime accidents. 
These range from auxiliary power failure through unknown to vandalism 
(U. S. Coast Guard 1989). An unpublished study for the Maritime Training 
and Research Center in Toledo, Ohio, examined collision and grounding 
data in U.S. waters for vessels greater than 1000 tons from 1984-88 
inclusive. Four causes produced nearly 50% of the accidents: error in 
judgement, lack of knowledge, carelessness, and operator error. 
As these two major studies demonstrate, it is difficult to obtain 
written documentation of the near-miss experience. The near-miss 
experience could be construed as a negative statement about one's 
shiphandling capability (U. S. Department of Transportation 1986, 32; 
Drager 1980, 23) and thus have potential impact on one's professional 
license. And, although the experience seems to be universal, many are 
reluctant to describe it for others. There is however, potential for learning 
and understanding in the near-miss experience if those experiences can be 
carefully described and analyzed. 
This Project Demonstrating Excellence is a step toward such 
description and analysis. The research methodology is "descriptive" 
(Simon and Burstein 1985, 37) or "exploratory" (Crano and Brewer 1986, 
330). The focus of the research is on 'how' and 'why' a near-miss situation 
remained a near-miss rather than becoming an accident. 
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The study was conducted through case study methodology in 
interviews with first class pilots and masters on the Great Lakes who 
volunteered to tell their near-miss experiences in an attempt to provide 
learning for their peers. The research protocol, interview questions, and 
format were pre-tested with Great Lakes, military, and deep-sea captains 
prior to interviewing the Great Lakes population. Those pilot data are not 
included in the study. 
The near-miss under exploration occurs within the context of a 
vessel operating at a location, with a cargo or in ballast, and a crew. The 
principal focus of the study is the bridge-watch responsible for the 
navigation and safe handling of the vessel. On the US Great Lakes in close 
waters, a typical bridge-watch will include the captain, a qualified watch 
officer, a seaman trained as helmsman, and one or more look-outs 
(watchmen), generally either officers or skilled ratings. 
The bridge-watch is a small self-contained unit of an organization. It 
meets the general structural and process elements which have been 
articulated by organization theorists including Bolman and Deal (1984), 
Champion (1975), Dessler (1980), Gerloff(1985), Hall (1982), and Mackenzie 
(1986). Thus, the field of organization is the larger framework in which the 
study has been conducted. 
Gerloff defines organization theory as " ... an assemblage of concepts, 
principles, and practices which have been (and are being) codified to 
explain organizational phenomena" (10). 
Organization theory includes as structural elements: boundary, size, 
technology, differentiation, integration, information and power. A critical 
assumption to this Project Demonstrating Excellence is that the near-miss 
occurs only when someone or something takes the situation out of the 
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normal organization structure or process. Without such occurrence the 
consequence of the situation is an accident rather than a near-miss. The 
work addresses the following questions through interviews with ten 
professional mariners: 
* In what ways, and, 
* To what degree, and 
*Why did you (or another person) step out of the normal 
structure or process and turn the accident into a near-
miss. 
This is a multiple case design (Yin 1989, 53) in that multiple masters 
are included and the purpose of the case study is not to survey "have you 
had a near-miss experience - and how many" but to replicate how and why 
a potential accident became a near-miss. All masters and first class pilots 
who are members of District 2 MEBA-AMO sailing on the Great Lakes, 
were provided the opportunity to participate in the research. All those who 
replied in the affirmative and were available for a personal conversation 
with the researcher have been included in this case study. The 
presentation of the stories in Chapter 4, includes all of the near-miss 
experiences which those reporters described. The data are in the words of 
the reporters with only minimal editing for clarity and sequencing of 
events. 
Criteria for analysis and interpretation will be to establish the 
propositions as independent variables and match the case data to these 
propositions. It is assumed that these variables are mutually exclusive 
(Yin 1989, 111). It is proposed that one or more of the following 
(independent and mutually exclusive) events occurred which took the 
situation out of the normal organization structure. 
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1) The captain or another watch officer opened· the door for an alternative 
structure. That is, the captain or senior watch officer present turned 
to another member of the bridge-watch and· said (words to the effect) 
"\Vhat do you. think is,happening, what should! we .do"? 
2) Someone· else on the .bridge-watch sfupped' forward .and stepped out 
of role required1 by the vertical or horizontal differentiation and drew 
the .attention·of.the watch officer or captain to the situation. 
• ' I 1 
3) The fear of the potential accident overcame the fear of the master's 
reprisal (see Hershey 1988). and. someone stepped out of the typical 
structure~ · 
4) A peer relationship between captains or watch officers was the 
foundation for the change. 
5) A prior relationship·existed between one or more members of the bridge-
watch and that prior relationship was the foundation for change. 
If there are patterns of communication and coordination or changes 
in the structure of the organization which lead to near-misses, then 
technically and by ideation, it should be possible to train masters and first 
class pilots in those practices and means of communication and 
coordination. Such training should contribute to the reduced frequency or 
severity of accidents; the loss .of life, cargoes, or the vessel; or the pollution 
of the environment within the global village. Such accident reduction is the 
social meaning of the project and the driving motivator for the researcher. 
Chapter 2 describes the· theoretical and conceptual context of the 
work; the field of organization. Chapter 3 describes the methodology; a 
multiple case study. Chapter 4 contains the maritime descriptions of 
twenty"seven near-miss experiences related by ten professional mariners. 
Chapter 5 describes the analysis of the near-miss experiences and the 
conclusions reached by the study. Chapter 6 describes appropriate future 
research and methodologies. 
6 
CHAPTER2 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
' ' ' - - . : 
Introduction 
'!Organization theory, is• the body·ofthinkinKand writing which 
addresses itself to the problem of how to organize. (It) can be defined as the 
study of the structure, functioning, and performance of organizations and 
the behavior of groups and individuals within them" (Pugh 1984, 9). 
There is no universally accepted taxonomy of organization, structure, 
and process (Bolman and Deal.1984, Champion 1975, Gerloff 1985, Hall 
1982, Miller 1978, Mackenzie 1986). In contrast to the physical sciences, the 
science of organization has a range of perspectives and taxonomies, Each 
theorist emphasizes different elements and considers each element as 
having differing importance in the resolution of the problem: how to 
orga~ize. 
This contextual framework sets out three perspectives of organization 
theory: .system, social complexity, and architectural. These perspectives 
accentuate the differences in viewpoint expressed by the theorists. The 
framework reviews the contributions made by Burns and Stalker (Gerloff 
1985), Mackenzie 1986, Miller 1978, Mintzberg 1979, 1989, Pasmore 1988, 
Perrow 1970, 1984, 1986, Pfeffer 1978, Pugh 1984, and Woodward 1965. Beven 
common elements of organization are described: boundary, technology, 
differentiation, integration, rewards, information, and size. This 
description of these elements emphasizes the similarities in the theoretical 
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positions. The typical merchant marine organization, at the shipboard . 
level, is· described using this list of elements. Finally, the literature 
describing. th~ maritime near miss ex:periEmce' is ~eviewed. 
'This contextual framework positions the research in the field of 
organization; the structural elements which. influence shipboard decision 
., 
making and actions in situations involving a near-miss. 
It is important·to note that ihere are three common,:oft.en implicit, 
assUmptions in the study of human organization. They have been 
articulated by J. March (1Pugh 1984), by H. Simon (P\lgh and Hickson 1980), 
and by Gerloff (1985 ). 
The first assumption is that human organizations are goal-seeking 
entities and that flexibility, change, and adaptation are the natural 
consequence of reacting to changing internal or external demands. Goals 
in human organization are of special interest (Donaldson 1985, 22). He 
says: 
Whilst it is true that only humans can define goals (ideal future 
states), and that organizational goals are defined by humans, what 
makes the goals organizational is the process of their authorization 
and institutionalization. This latter process ensures that goals, once 
understood and shared, and perhaps backed by detailed plans and 
schedules, can survive the death of most of their architects. The 
process of authorization involves the organization giving its legitimacy 
to the objectives (just like the University of Oxford grants degrees). 
This makes the objectives the property of a supra-individual 'entity'. 
This institutionalization process, similarly, makes the objectives the 
property of the supra-individual collectivity. 
James March (Pugh 1984, 225) says: "Whether we are talking about 
individuals or about organizations, purpose is an obvious presumption of 
the discussion. An organization is often defined in terms of its purpose. It 
is seen by some as the largest collectivity directed by a purpose. Acti~n 
within an organization is justified (or criticized) in terms of the .purpose." 
8 
The second implicit assumption about human organizations is that 
they are not self-destructive· but have an ~on-going. consistency. According to 
March (Pugh, 225) "~ .. consistency is a cultural and theoretical virtue. 
Action should be made consistent with belief. Actions· taken by different 
parts. of an organization should be consistent with each other. Individual 
and organizational' activities are seen as connected with each other in 
terms of their consequences for some consistent set of purposes." 
The third assumption has been defined by March <Pugh 1984) and by 
Simon (Pugh and Hickson 1989) as a "primacy of rationality." There is " ... 
a procedure for deciding what is correct behavior by relating consequences 
systematically to objectives" ~Pugh 1984, 225). 
Simon (Pugh and Hickson 1989, 120) continues the discussion: 
The traditional theory of economists assumed complete rationality. 
Their model was of 'economic man' (which, ofcourse, embraced 
woman) who deals with the real world in all its complexity. He selects 
the rationally determined best course of action from among all those 
available to him in order to maximize his returns. In place of 
'economic man' (we) propose a model of ~administrative man'. While 
economic man maxiniizes (i.e. selects the best course from those 
available), administrative inan 'satisfices: - looking for a course of 
action that is satisfactory or 'good enough'. In this process decision-
makers are content with gross simplifications, taking into account 
only those comparatively few relevant factors which their minds can 
manage to encompass. Thus administrators who 'satisfice' can make 
decisions without searching for all the possible alternatives and can 
use relatively simple rules of thumb. In business terms. they do not 
look for 'maximum. profit' but 'adequate profit'; not 'optimum price' 
but· 'fair price'. · 
Thus, there are limits, or bounds, to the rationality based upon " ... a 
limited-capacity information-processing system ... " (Pugh, 225) and the 
limitations of satisficing in contrast to maximizing. 
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Perspectives 
The .selection of perspective of organization which follows has been 
chosen as a method to demonstrate the bounds of the work. The three 
perspectives - system, social complexity, and architectural - capture three 
levels of 'the field: the conceptual, the. social! science orientation, and the 
application. 
The system .perspective is based on the ·conceptions of general system 
theory. James G. Miller (1978) has produced the most comprehensive 
conceptual statement of the living system(open system) field of that theory. 
Brain of the Firm by Stafford Beer (1981) is.a co;nceptual outline .of how 
systems should' ~stablish control and structure recursion in order to 
manage inputs, throughputs, and outputs. 
The social complexity perspective defines the work in the social 
sciences. The author's undergraduate perspectives in economics and 
political science are reinforced by references from sociology and psychology. 
Pfeffer (1978), Tuggle (1978), Kotter (1979), and Perrow (1986) capture the 
themes of this perspective. 
The architectural perspective is somewhat harder to visualize. There 
is recognition in the field that" ... {we) have not (yet) produced perfect 
organizations ... " ~Pasmore 1988, 88). Rather, there are a number of 
approaches which have been developed to assist in the design process. 
Neither Galbraith and Kazanjian .(1986) nor Mintzberg (1989) set out to 
demonstrate such a perspective; yet their work raised important questions 
for the organization architect about the environmental location of the 
organization (Galbraith. and Kazanjian) and the configuration .or general 
shape of the organization (Mintzberg). Mackenzie (1986) and Pas more 
(1988), on the other hand, set out to describe the fundamental principles and 
practices in designing an organization. Pasmore is more generalized, 
Mackenzie is •qui~e specific. 
The systemic perspective is nearly universal in current thought. The 
concepts of system wholtmess, botinda~, and enVironment are included or 
implied in all current theoretical or expository writings. This review 
describes two levels .of the perspective: the 'living systems vi~w of Miller 
(1978) and the cybernetic views of Beer (1981, 1985). 
Miller (1978) places organization midway in the hierarchy of living 
systems: cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society, and 
supranational society. His conceptual framework describes each or'these 
seven levels from a consistent perspective: structure, process, subsystems, 
relationships, system-wide process, and models and simulation. It is his 
view that all levels have, or are able to obtain, the same kinds of 
requirements for continued existence. Liv,ing Systems is " ... an effort to 
integrate all the social, biological, and physical sciences that apply to 
structure or process at any of the seven levels. Physiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, pharmacology, medicine, economics, political science, anthro-
pology, sociology, and psychology are all almost entirely relevant" (4). 
Organizations are systems with multiechelon deciders whose com-
ponents and subsystems may be subsidiary organizations; groups, and 
(uncommonly) single persons. In my conceptual system they are 
concrete living systems with components tha:t are also concrete living 
systems rather than abstracted systems whose units are actions or 
roles. Organizations are subsystems, components, or subcomponents 
of societies, sometimes .of more than one society. Some societies have 
single organisms or groups, as well as organizations, as principal 
components. International and supranational systems, such as 
General Motors and Interpol, have organizational components which 
exist in more than one society. Organizational components can also be 
inclusions in societies other than the one to whose subsystem structure 
they belong, e.g., Japanese marketing organizations in Australia and 
Canada. The critical difference between :organizations and groups is 
in the structure of the decider. Organizations always have at least two 
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echelons in their ·deciders, even when ·they are so smaU that each 
person can interact in a face-to-face relationship with all the others. 
Group deciders have no formally designated echelons (595). 
Groups, the next smaller level, is described: 
A group is a .set of single organisms, commonly called members, 
which, over a period of time or multiple futerrupted periods, relate to 
one another face-to-face, processing matter~energy and iriformation. 
The components of groups are animals - human and• subhuman. 
Monerans, protistans, fungi, and plants. do not form groups. 
Groups differ from organizations, the next higher· level of living 
systems, in.three ways: (a) the members, though ordinarily mobile, 
are usually 11ear enough together to see and hear one another; (b) each 
one• potentially can communicate directly with every other .one over 
two-WfiY channels, although some of these may not be open at all 
times; and (c) there are no echelons, since by definition an 
organizations is a system with echelons composed chiefly of groups 
·(and perhaps some single individual organisms) ( 515): 
About socie.ties, he says: 
A society is a large, living, concrete system with organizations and 
lower levels of living systems as subsystems and components, Ancient 
city-states and kingdoms were societies, as are modem nation-states 
and empires that are not supranational systems. Small, primitive, 
totipotential communities are also societies if they are not components 
of another society .... Unlike most organizations, all societies, as 
Parsons .and his associates noted, are totipotential. They have a 
complete set ofmatter-energy and information processing subsystems 
(747). 
Thus, Miller differentiates organizations from groups and societies on 
.the basis of the decider " ... the executive subsystem which receives 
information inputs from all other subsytems and transmits to them 
information outputs that control the entire organization" (642), 
The organization decider is multi-echelon and time-space dispersed in 
structure. The group decider is a single echelon arid operates face-to-face. 
Organization deciders are " .. .limited by the past and present decisions of 
their society. Organizations, in fact, are ~uch like organs in their 
parasitism upon, or symbiosis with, the supra system of which they are a 
part. There are no free-living organs as there are free-living cells. If an 
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organization is to exist independently .. .it must atypically develop all the 
critical subsystems, or it will disappear" (595-596). 
Miller uses a modern ocean liner (604"605) to demonstrate .the system 
characteristics of organization. In addition to the 'decider' he clearly 
identifies the.system.bouildary (the hull); the system environment (the" 
' 1 - ' ' 
. ' t - • I • • I 
ocean ·and the atmosphere) and the system's subsystems. 
The cybernetiC view ofsystems (organizations) is predicated upon the 
establishment of goals and parameters of performance and the formulation 
. . . 
of self-correcting mechanisms through muiWlayered feedback loops which 
sense a .position of the system in its environment and stimulate responses 
wi~n the system. Stafford Beer (1985, 1.) defines such a system as 
" ... viable, able to maintain a separate existence." The viable system is 
characterized by control; by " ... becoming aware of itself ... " (Beer 1981, 25), 
and by its ability to " ... measure its own internal tendency to depart from 
stability, and a set of rules for experimenting with responses which will 
tend back to an internal equilibrium" (27). 
Control is exemplified by the electronic computer. The computer has 
been used by organizations (and managers) to " ... soup-up the ways of 
regulating matters with which managers are already familiar" (Beer 1985, 
14). Beer argues that the 'more and quicker' approach of computer 
operators and managers has led to our " ... replacing one thing by another 
which is indeed more effective, and now we have a great vision whereby all 
these bits and pieces (of organizational information) Will be integrated in a 
vast.informational network. The whole firm will be run on a basis of 
'instant fact', because managers will draw any item ofkilowledge they 
require from a huge data base into which .all the facts about the business 
Will be poured" (Beer 1985, 16). 
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But control is based on information- meaning- and facts " ... become 
information only when something,is changed" (16). The demand is for a 
control system and· not more ~r faste~'tnformation. Control 8I~o is. 
concerned with " ... ~omplexity beyond the capacity ofthose senior people to 
absorb and interpret it. Therefore .it 'has to do \Viththe structure of 
information flows, with the method ~f i~ormati.o~ ~andling, ~th 
techniques for information reduction, and so forth" (80), 
There is, today, a capability to deal with data in excess of the ability of 
human capacity alone. The function of control must be delegated to the 
computer - as other functions have been delegated to other people (i.e. 
finance, marketing, operations). "The manager no more abdicates in favor 
of computers because they are more sophisticated in control than he, than 
in favor of maintenance men because they can keep the plant working and 
he cannot. But he has to know how to organize the maintenance men to 
keep the plant working, and he has to know how to organize computers to 
effect .the firm's control. Moreover, he has to organize the plant so that it 
can be maintained; he has also to organize the firm so that it can be 
computed with" (80). 
From a living systems foundation (see Miller), Beer proposes that 
control can be perceived as " ... part of the system under control...riot 
something stuck on by higher authority which is then accorded managerial 
prerogatives" (25). This leads to the second requirement that the 
organization be " ... aware of itself..." (27). 
In order to be aware of itself, the system (organization) only needs 
... a way of measuring its own internal tendency to depart from 
stability, and a set of rules for experimenting with responses which 
will tend back to an internal equilibrium. There is no need to know in 
advance what nlight cause a disturbance; there is no need to know 
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what has caused· a disturbance •. To rbe aware of something happening 
andJabel it disturbance, and to be able tor alter internal states until" 
effects ofthe disturbance are offset, is enough (27). 
Given this 'self~awareness', the system needs a means of'"~ .. finding 
out .•. " - anheuristic method. Such an heuristic " ... specifies a method of 
behaving which will tend towards a goal which cannot be precisely 
specified becaus~ we know what it is but not where it is";(52), For example, 
from.Dayton, Ohio one can. reach Florida by driviog southeast. Such 
organization heuristic_s describ.e, general rules toward a goal but not a 
' (' . . . 
specific route and may be incorporated 'into computer (or control 
mechanism) logic st~cture~, 
A viable organization, then, is one which is structured around 
information flows (inputs), control mechanisms (of outputs), an awareness 
of self in an environment (disturbances from the expected), .and heuristics 
(rules) for determining means to return to a steady state. As a conceptual 
framework rather than an architectural framework (see Galbraith and 
Kazanjian, Mackenzie, Mintzberg, and Pasmore) the systemic/cybernetic 
perspective describes what the organization should· contain but not how that 
should be created. 
The socio-political or social complexity perspective is a way to balance 
the forces of naivete and cynicism. "Most of us, to be blunt, are remarkably 
naive when it comes to understanding power dynamics in complex 
organizations. At the same time, others of us are incredibly cynical. Both 
distort social reality and thus act on bad information ... " (Kotter 1985, 1989). 
A social complexity perspective would argue that it is not:by chance 
that the economists' traditional model of a firm, where only "rational" 
economic decision making occurred, and where power struggles and 
politics were nonexistent, was a small and technologically simple 
organization tha:t operated in an environment without large custo-
mers, suppliers, unions, or governmental regulators, and that 
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employed a relatively homogeneous labor force in a simple organiza-
tion structure (21)~ 
Social compleXity is made up ·of the iss.ues of goals, coalitions, control, 
power and politics, action, .and conflict. 
An organization goal (or its synonym, objective) is a " ... description of a 
desired future state ofthe organization or its environment" (Tuggle 1978, 
Miller 1978)~ Such goals a~e institutionalized' and_ provide a focus for action 
. ' \ ; ,. : 
(Donaldson' 1985, 22). The need fo~ goals is ;based on " ... a lack of consensus. 
If everybody's individual p~eference function were the same, there would be 
no need for goals to guide, unify, explain, direct, coordinate, and control 
behavior; there would be no need tb do SO• because no one would disagree Or 
vary from the template. But people are different, and so goals are 
necessary" (Tuggle, 24). 
Pfeffer (1978, 2"3) suggests that " ... control itself, not control as a means 
of ensuring the efficient production of output, becomes the objective of 
action." Surely these coalitions ai:e engaged in controlling the specific 
output of goods and services which the organization provides to its 
environment. At the same time, these coalitions seek to control the 
behavior in organizations through " .. ;organizational rules, systems of 
evaluation, and structure. The techniques of.control are prominent in the 
social, psychological, and sociological literature on organizations -
socializa'tion, social influence, conformity, social learning, and role 
behavior" (2-3). 
Handy (1985, 120-127) describes six. forms of power within the 
organization. Physical power is the superior force of the bully: in the school 
yard, on the picket line, in the police force, in the developing nation, and in 
the dictatorial boss. Resource or reward power is implicit in contractual 
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situations' when one· party has control of the resources and. the other party 
·desires use or access to those resources. Position or legitimate power 
comes from a role or·position in the organization and is backed up by 
physical or 'resource .power: manager, supervisor, legal' counsel. Expert 
power is vested based upon an acknowledged expertise: doctor, legal 
counsel, production consultant. Personal power or charisma is that which 
comes from within the person or his personality: sports stars, corporate 
chairman (lacocca), cult leaders. Nega:tive power is the ability to halt or to 
disrupt the flow of activities: mail clerk, .personnel officer, •secretary. 
. ' 
Perrow (1986, 259) describes powerin the organization·as: 
... the ability of persons or groups to extract for themselves valued 
outputs from a system in which other persons or groups either seek 
the same outputs for themselves or would prefer to expend their effort 
toward other outputs. Power is exercised to alter ·th(! initial distri-
bution of outputs, to establish an uneq~al distribution,: or to change the 
outputs. We could put it in terms ofgoals: there is a .struggle over 
either the content ofthe output or the distribution of it. This is a 
'power over' rather than a 'power with' view; it deals with the type of 
pie and the division of the pie, not its size~ The.question of the size of 
the pie, increasing the output no matter who gets it, is an• important 
one, but it cannot operate independently ofthe distribution issue and 
the content issue, which are prior and thus the more important 
concerns. 
"Organizations are political systems, coalitions of interests, and 
rationality is defined only with respect to unitary and consistent orderings 
of preferences. If every person can get all he wants, or what he wants, then 
there is no need to use social power and influence because everyone can be 
satisfied simultaneously" (Pfeffer, 12). 
It is implicit in these analyses and conclusions that at some point the 
organization will be required to take action internally to produce goods or 
services or to eXport those products to the environment. Tuggle (1978, 42) 
says: 
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1For an organization to take action, scarce resources (e.g. dollars) 
must be consumed. Before they are used, resources must be 
authorized' to be expende~ " the two major forms of authorization are 
budgets and contracts. When an organization creates an action goal 
(or modifies an old action goal) which requires a change in ·resource 
level, that nonoperational goal is made more operational through its 
budget or •contract level. 
Power flows to departments - or individuals or groups - which cope 
with uncertainty or which are central to the work-flow of the organization 
(Ge;loff, 170). Thus, reducing .the unc~rtainty of another:s position, or_ 
' ' ' 
. . . 
taking-on critical organizational functions, or making one's own work 
more complex will all lead' to a potential incre11;se in organization power 
and influence over the use of resources and control. 
' ' .,·: ' . 
Conflict is the 'inevitable result of this social complexity in 
organizations. Beginning with the establishment and institutionalization 
of goals, to the forming and reforming of coalitions and the exercise of 
control and influence, to the distribution .of insufficient resources to do 
everything, social complexity is the spice of organization theory. One need 
not be a cynic nor be naive as he/she works within social complexity; one 
can recognize the world of organization as it is and live within its confines. 
The architectural perspective of organization theory is that human 
organizations may be designed or engineered in such a way as to make 
them more effective within their given environment. The process is based 
upon a "center of gravity" (Galbraith and Kazanjian), "configurations" 
(Mintzberg), "socio-technical systems" (Pasmore) or building blocks of "task 
processes and task process resources" (Mackenzie). In all cases there is an 
arrangement of patterns to facilitate the accomplishment of organizational 
goals. 
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A .principal assumption ofthe perspective is that " ... every 
organization has the problem of continually organizing itself to achieve its 
goals in the face of change, much of which it does not control ... " 
(Mackenzie 1984, 5). Since organizations are " ... invented •social 
mechanisms to convert goals into results, .. " {4) the architectural 
perspective requires the organization have knowable goals and means of 
assessment of external (environmental) limitations and that. it not 
knowingly engage in self-destructive activities. 
Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986, 51) approach organization from a more 
global view. Rather than looking inward as do Mintzberg and Mackenzie, 
they see organization as a function of "center of gravity". They say: 
. . 
A company establishes its center of gravity by starting operations in 
a particular industry at a particular stage of that industry. If and 
when it is successful, the company learns the management lessons of 
that stage and that industry. This point is important, because each 
stage of any industry has different success factors. Thus, the 
organization. and its management are shaped by the lessons learned at 
their stage in an industry. Their values, their management systems, 
their :business lessons, their organization, their path of succession, 
and their mind sets are all shaped by the stage of initial success. They 
have established an anchor, a center of.gravity. 
The center ofgravity is seen as a position or series of positions occupied 
by the orgB;Jlization on a continuum or flow from raw materials to 
consumer purchase in the given industry. Figure 1 depicts this flow for 
typical manufacturing firms. An organization may change its center of 
gravity over time. As it does so, the nature of the organization must be 
changed (designed) in " ... all of the organization dimensions •.. " (65). 
"A center of gravity shift requires a dismantling of the current power 
structure, rejection· of the. old culture, and establishing all: new systems" 
(65-67). Since. the organization is industry- and center of gravity- specific, 
the new organization can be designed· using related. or competitive 
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.organizations as the guide until the new position begins to produce 
learning. 
Mintzberg (1989) desc.ribes six common parts to all organizations: an 
ideology (also referred to as culture); a strategic' apex, a middle li1,1e, ·an 
operating core, a support staff, and a technostructure. The relativ.e .size of 
each of these parts (elements) determines the nature (architecture) of the 
· organization (see figure 2). 
The ideology (or culture) includes the" ..• traditions and beliefs of an 
organization that distinguish it from other organizations and infuse a 
certain life into. the skeleton of its structure" (98). The middle line .is the " ... 
;". ' ' . 
hierarchy ,of autho.rity ... between the operating core .•.• where the products 
or services are created ... and the _stra_tegic apex from whenc~ the ... whole 
system is overseen" (98). The support staff provides " ... va.rious internal 
services including legal and public relation ... " and the tec~ostructure 
" ... plans and coordinates ... " the work of others as well as providing 
" ... analysis ... " (98). Both the technostructure and the support staff are 
outside the direct hierarchy from_strategic apex through middle line to the 
operating core. 
These six parts of the organization can be designed into seven different 
configurations which lead to " ... consistency and the achievement of 
organizational goals" (110). The configurations, and attenda1,1t p.rimary 
part of the organization, are: Entrepreneu.rial, the strategic apex; 
Machine/bureaucratic, the technostructure; Professional, the operating 
core; Diversified, the middle line; Innovative, the support staff; Missionary, 
the ideology; and Political, none. 
Raw Pr1mary Product Consumer 
Materials Manufacturer Fabricator Producer Marketer Retail 
• • • • 
!consumer 
• • 
_________ _.. 
Supply Flow 
Figure 1 Supply Stages in a Manufacturing Industry 
Reprinted from Jay R. Galbraith and Robert K Kazanjian, 
Skatee:y Implementation: Structure. Systems and Process, 
Second Edition, (West Publishing Company, New York, 1986), 
p. 51. 
OpemingCo,.. 
~ ~ ~"l/111111111111 11 111111111111 1 11111111111111111111111111 '''" 
Figure 2 Six Basic Parts of the Organization 
Reprinted from Henry Mintzberg, Mintzber~ on Mana~ement. 
(The Free Press, New York, 1989), p. 99. 
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Each of these configurations is developed from ·the generalized shape 
shown. in Figure 2. For each configuration, the associated primary part is 
la:r:ger in "pulls" (111); size or influence. "When .conditions favor one of 
these pulls; the organization is drawn to design itself as a particular 
configuration ... " (110). This design may be accomplished " ... way up 
there ... or as the result of convergence into patterns ... , deliberate and then 
legitimized" (31). 
The socio-technical systems approach is based on the work of Eric Trist 
and the Tavistock Institute of the 1950's and 1960's (Pasmore 1988, ix). The 
approach has been used to design or redesign many organizations of 
different size, in different industries, and in all parts of the world. 
The ftindamental principle of socio-technical systems is that 
organizations are open systems, made up of a social (human) network and 
a technology (a means of transformation of goods or services), interacting 
fully with an environment. The environment limits the "freedom" of the 
systems such that. the organization cannot do "everything" but at the same 
time provides resources to allow the organization to do "something". The 
architectural task is to balance the requirements of the environment within 
its resources and to balance the internal social and technological networks 
into a cohesive whole (Pasmore, 7-23). 
The first requirement for an organization design/redesign is to 
conduct a full' analysis of the environment. Since the environment presents 
both constraints and opportunities, these must be carefully articulated so 
that the internal networks produce acceptable (to the environment) results. 
The product of this analysis is a clear description of the boundary of the 
organization, the expectations of the environment, an~ a clarification .of the 
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.organizational goals te. how it wilhespondi to the demands of the 
environment ~Pasmore, 113-1i9; Williamson 1986, 105). 
The social network is made up of individuals and groups which · 
interact. The focus of the perspective is at these <levels, rather than at 
Miller's organization level, since all work efforts are described, by this 
perspective, in terms of individuals or groups. 
The lllacro-level of the social· network is concerned with culture and 
structure. According to Schein (1985, 9), organization culture is: " ... a . 
' .. , ' . 
pattern: of basic assumptions.- invented, discovered, ~r d!ilv~l~ped l>y a giv~n 
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external· adaptation and 
internal integration - that.has worked well enough to be considered valid 
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the.correct way to perceive, 
' • -~,· - r' . 
think, and feel in relation to those problems." 
Culture is neither static nor precisely measurable. It changes as new 
people or new technologies are introduced inside the organization. It 
changes as the environment shifts and adapts to the changing cultures of 
other organizations. Because culture is based on individual and group 
perceptions, it is ambiguous. Thus, the "reflections of culture" (Schein, 6) 
may be measured - although the results may be transitory - but the culture 
itself is not measurable. 
The socio-technical perspective outlines twelve elements of 
organization structure: " ... reporting relationships, rights of office, 
departmental boundaries, reward systems, policies, procedures, legal 
constraints, the size of organizational units, control systems, rules, 
information systems, and physical artifacts which help shape behavior" 
(~Pasmore, 39). 
"There is no single structural: constellation that is innately right or 
wrong from a sociotechnical systems perspective. Instead, the fit ofthe 
·structure .with the desired social system dynamics is more important to 
consider" (:Pasmore, 41). 
There are three basic prinCiples in creating the technical network in a 
socio~te_chnical system design .. ·Fir~t is variance ahd the control of variance 
in the technical processes: 'rhis perspective, as does the cybernetic (Beer 
1981), includes reference to A:shby's law of requisite_.variety in that the 
variability of output.must equal the variability of input (Pasmore, 64). The 
.- ' J -' -. • • .. • - ' ~ 
r ' • ' t 
second principle 'iS that the " ... effectlvene'ss of the whole is more important 
than the effectiveness of the parts" (Pasmore, 67). Berrien (1968) discusses 
this at the general and at the social level in part as a conflict to maintain 
subsystem autonomy (85-87 and 170-176). The third principle is that 
"Boundaries between units should be drawn to facilitate variance control 
and to reduce group interdependencies" (Pasmore, 63). 
Pasmore (94-103) describes six advantages of the socio-technical 
systems design process: 
1. Innovation versus preserving the status quo. 
2. Development of human resources. 
3. Awareness of the external environment. 
4. Maximizing cooperative effort. 
5. Developing commitment and energy. 
6. Utilizing social and technical resources effectively. 
Mackenzie (1986, 3) approaches the architecture of the organization as 
a process which " ... involves intervening to design the entire organization 
[emphasis in .original]. It must consider the environments in which the 
organization operates, the goals and strategies, the underlying 
assumptions, the organization of all the task processes, the assignment of 
people and task processes to positions, how it actually operates, and the 
results produced. It must be done while the organization operates and 
continues the change. The results of an organization design can determine 
success or .failure of the organization as well a·s the impacts on individual 
careers. ... Organizational design is the natural' study of princes, 
commanders; and leaders. It is concerned with the age~old issues of who 
governs the organization and for whose benefit .does the organization exist 
to serve." 
For Mackenzie (43), the principal element of organization engineering 
is the work of the organization. He contrasts the economic view as one 
" ... unconcerned about how'[emphasis in original]input!! can. be converted 
0 
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to outputs •.. "and the ~rganiza:tional~ psychologisfs view which " ... believes 
that proper leadership and motivation will help" the individual be more 
' . . l . ' 
productive .... " 
All work may be described as ·a task process. which' reQ:~res the use of 
' •J ' ,'' 
task process resources. There are three levels of task process: execution; 
directing, controlling and coordinating; and planning (50-5!). Task 
processes may be aggregated at five levels: activities, modules, bundles, and 
areas which, taken together, form the organization logic. 
Activities are the lowest level and represent the "how" of the 
transformation process of producing goods and services. Activities can be 
aggregated by time and/or space similarities into modules. Bundles are 
formed from related modules and represent the first level of the 
"coordination process" (58). Bundles are then formed into groups which 
are further aggregated into areas of work. The summation of the 
aggregation yields an organization logic which describes the work to be 
done and the levels of coordination and planning required. 
Related activities are placed: contiguous to each other in such a way 
that coordination ·can occur. Unrelated activitie·s are separated by time 
and/or space such that the integration processes •become more formalized. 
This designed set of.relationships results in an organization responsibility 
grouping or ORG chart (76-77). 
The final consideration is to design the " ... organizational 
interdependencies ... " (133). These dependencies describe the larger 
relationships and the requirements for broad-view coordination and 
planning. 
Organization Structure 
In defining the field of organization in 1966, Rubenstein and 
Haberstroh (2) characterized the field as one of" ... growth ... which has led 
to ... a large amount of fragmentary and unintegrated ideas about how 
organizations do and should behave." They defined organizational 
structure as " ... the pattern of beliefs about the organization that are shared 
by those individuals who take the coordinated action that we define as 
organizational behavior" [emphasis in original], (64). 
They continue " ... one seeks for characteristics of these institutions 
sufficiently general to describe a wide range of specific organizations and 
yet useful for the purposes of explaining, predicting, and controlling the 
behavior of an individual organization" (64), 
Perrow (1970, 18-19) addressed the need for a single theory of 
organizations, thus [emphasis in original]: 
Can there be-one theory of organization or should there be many 
theories of organization? ... there are various types of organizations 
and ... we niay legitimately have theories that only apply to some types 
and not to others. We know enough about organizations now to 
recognize that most generalizations that are applicable to all 
organizations are too ·Obvious, or too general, to: be of much use for 
specific predictions. This. was not true in the past when :there was less 
organizational knowledge, fewer complex organizations, and fewer 
organizational varieties. One of the ·dominant themes ... will be that 
today organizations come in great variety and ,that .organizational 
theory must be varied to be. useful. 
Mintzberg states "~ .. structure (is the) pattern offormal relationships 
that determines how work is to be divided and coordinated" (1989, 20-2H 
This review examines the principal descriptors of structure in 
organization theory and the elements which are used to describe 
organizations. The review includes the essential, related contributions of 
Max Weber, T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, Joan Woodward, D. S .. Pugh, Paul 
Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Charles Perrow, Gerald Rage, and Henry 
Mintzberg. 
The classical description of organization structure was developed by 
Max Weber. He did not use ,the ·term. " ... bureaucracy in' a .pejorative 
sense ... " (Rubenstein and· Haberstroh, ·64) but rather as a description of' 
what he considered to be the "ideal type ,of organization, the most modern 
and technically efficient yet developed" (64). His focus was on the structure 
:of the type, its interreJationships, and consequences. 
Weber, as quoted in Rubenstein and Haberstroh (70-81) defined six 
"functions of modern officialdom" which defined the structure of the ideal 
organization. They are: 
I. " ... fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally 
ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations" (70) .. These 
areas might be geographical, physical, or pertain to a defined. 
administrative function. In government this was "bureaucratic authority" 
and in private enterprise it was "bureaucratic management." 
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ll. ": .. a firmly ordered system ofsuper- and sub-ordinates in which 
tp.ere· is a supervision of the lower offices by·the higher ones" (70). Sucn a 
system provides two identified advantages. First, there is :the opportunity of 
appealing the decision of a lower office (or officer) to a higner level office in 
a "regulated manner". The second advantage is that offices continue their 
existence after the departure (by elevation, death, promotion) of the 
incumbent. 
Ill. " ... management is based on written. documents, 'the files', which 
are preserved in their original· or draught forms" (71). Such records form 
an on-going memory of events and decisions which serve as precedent in 
future situations~ Rules of procedure or adiniriistratiori need not cover all 
' ~ .. • t . ' ' ' 
contingencies as long as precedent has also the strength of specific rules. 
IV. " ... usual.ly presuppo~es thorough and expert .training" (71). In 
' 
order to know all the rules and procedures, each bureaucratic 
administrator or manager, at :each levJl''inus't :be eXtensively trained to 
,' ,, ~ 
perform his duties to the expectations of the enterprise. Such training 
would require on-going and frequent up-grading. 
V. " ... activity demands the. full working capacity of the official..." (71). 
Bureaucratic officials could not be· expected to have either time or energy to 
pursue other forms of occupation or vocation. The official duties of each 
incumbent were to be sufficiently large and complex to require the full 
efforts of all officials. This distinguishes between "bureaucratic and 
honorific" endeavors. 
VI. " ... the management ... follows general rules, which are more or 
less stable, more orless exhaustive, and which can be learned" (71). The 
bureaucratic enterprise is long lived, permanent according to Weber (79). 
As such the rules of procedure (given, .established, or based on precedent) 
}>ecome more and more all-encompassing and create stability within the 
or~anization. Such an organizati'on can be learned, as. can the .rules of 
procedure (see IV, above). 
Richard Hall (1982, 28-30), re-casts Weber's· elements .of structure into 
more current concept and language. He states that Weber established 
seven criteria for the organization: 
- social relationships 
-boundary 
- order by design or purpose 
- hierarchy of authority 
- diVision of labor (differentiation) 
- associative (rather than communal interactions) 
- continuous purposive activities 
Bums and Stalker were interested in how organizations were affected 
by their environment. Of particular interest were changes in the 
marketplace in which the organization operated arid in the technology 
employed within the firm (Gerloff 1985, 51). 
Their conclusion was that bureaucratic structures are particularly 
appropriate in times of environmental stability. However, in times of 
environmental, marketplace, or technological instability, they conclude 
that the organization should change the nature of' its structure. These 
forms of organizations they labelled " ... mechanistic and organismic" [later 
changed to organic]. Although they spoke of the mix of these as a 
continuum they did not identify any positions on that continuum (Handy 
1985, 444). 
The distinctive features of.the two forms oforganization are shown in 
Figure 3. 
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DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF MECHANISTIC AND ORGANIC:MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Mechanistic systems 
l. High· emphasis is·placed on subdivision of 
task and differentiation. 
2. Functional specialists ore concerned with 
improving teChnical means of their tasks. 
3. SupervisOrs at etlch•hierorchicallevel 
seek tO integmte and reconcile 
performance offunctions reporting tO 
them. 
4. Rights, obligations, and technical 
methods of each functional position ore 
precisely defined and·assigned. 
6. Authority, i:ontrol, and communication ore 
legitimats and hierarchical in nature. 
6. It is assumed that the necessary 
knowledge for ultimata reconciliation of 
functions is at the•tOp of the hi~rarchy. 
7. High levels ofver.tical·interaction patterns· 
exist between superior and subordinate. 
8. Communication contsnt emphasizes 
directions and orders. 
9. Loyalty tO the organization and obedience 
tO superiors is a condition of 
employment. 
10. Prestige is attached tO achievement of 
position in the organization Oocal). 
Organic systeiDB 
1. l.ow•emphasis is placed• on specialization 
or standardization except·as they 
realistically contribute tO oVemll tasks 
and goals. 
2. Emphasis is placed on special 
knowledge and experience and.their 
contribution tO overall :tasks and• goals: 
3. Individtial task activities·are continuously 
redefined through intemction with others .. 
4. Responsibility and obligation ore loosely 
defined; problems cannot be passed up, 
down, or latsraily. 
5. Commitment tO the organization is 
broadly defined, not narrow and. 
technical. 
6. Authority, control, and communication 
are derived'from common.interests and 
needs:and ore not based strictly on 
contractual· obligations,, 
7. Knowledge and competence ore equally 
distributsdithroughoilt:the hierarchy. 
Exact location·is contigent on the 
nature of problem. 
a. High levels oflate'ral interaction patterns 
exist between participants: consultation 
instead of command. 
9. Communication content emphasizes 
ii'lforrnation and'adVice. 
10. Commitment to goals is more important 
than loyalty and obedience. 
11. Prestige is attached·tO external technical 
and professional affiliations 
(cosmopolitan). 
Figure 3 Reprinted from Edwin A. Gerloff, Organizational Theory and 
Design, (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985),.p. 52. Source: T. Burns 
and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation. (London: 
Tavistock Publications, Ltd., 1961), pp. 119-122~' 
A critiqu~ of the Bums and' Stalker·model by Gerloff (54); is based on 
the i}aterresearch by Bourgeois et al in 1978 which suggests that, in 
practice, individuals faced with environmental instability tend' to favor 
more mechanistic rather than less mechanistic systems. Further, it is 
only in· periods of environmental stability when they choose organic 
systems. 
Joan Woodward (1965, 17-49) and her colleagues .studied one hundred 
firms of various sizes arid,products over a. period of nearly ten years .. The 
initial research was designed to measure the classical theory concerns 
with organization: line organization; functional organization,and line-staff 
. \ 
organization. The research reached no conclusions until the issue of the 
technology employed in e~ch ofthe firms was incorpo;~t«:ld -ir~to the 
analysis. Eventually the data were grouped into eleven categories of 
technology employed, roughly: unit/one-off production, batch/mass 
production, and process/continuous production. 
Her conclusion was that " .. .it might be possible ... to build stabilized 
variable models of the kind used by economists" (248). 
Although not all the Woodward conclusions have been confirmed 
(Gerloff 1985, 86-90; Handy 1985, 445; Pugh 1987, 82-85), her work remains a 
major contribution to the question of structure. 
Her conclusions were (Woodward 1965): 
... the main conclusion reached through this research project was 
that the existence ·of the link between technology and 'Social structure 
first postulated by Thorstein Veblen (1904) can be demonstrated 
empincally. It is not suggested that the research proved technology to 
the the only important variable in determining organizational 
structure, or that such factors as the history and background of a firm 
and the personalities of the people who built it up and subsequently 
managed it were unimportant (50). 
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... in firms where two systems of production are combined there was a 
tendency to organize each system independently (51) . 
..• as production technology advanced, moving towards continuous-
flow and process systems, the distinction between line roles and staff 
roles became less clear"cut, and specialist skills (although of greater 
importance) became increasingly incorporated into the line ·and linked 
with executive (decision making) responsibility (96) . 
.. .in the technically advanced firms .(process) the co-ordination of 
work does not depend upon organizational structure or on co-operation 
between people .... the design or mechanism for the co-ordinating of 
work is intrinsic in the plant itself(123) . 
... the senior executives responsible for development, production, and 
marketing were more autonomous (in batch and mass production) 
than their counterparts in unit production (144). 
Further, 
" ... Woodward believed that her data clearly demonstrated the presence 
of several direct relationships ·between technology and structure .... as 
the level of technology advanced (from unit through mass to 
continuous .production) there were corresponding increases in the 
number of levels in the scalar chain; the span of control of the chief 
executive; the ratio of managers and .supervisors to nonsupervisory 
personnel; the size of the clerical and administrative group; and the 
proportion of indirect to direct workers" (Gerloff 1985, 86). 
The Aston Studies, of Pugh, Hickson, and others, provide a dissenting 
perspective from that of Woodward. These studies developed a comparative 
scale " ... so that positions of particular organization on those scales form a 
profile ofthe organization" (Pugh 1984, 70). 
Six dimensions were created for research involving fifty-two 
organizations both private and public (municipal and central government 
ownership). The dimensions were: functional speci~ization, 
standardization, standardization of employment practices, formalization, 
centralization, and configuration (Pugh 71). 
The conclusions of the Aston Studies suggested that technology 
(defined by Woodward) as determinant to structure was limited to only the 
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smaller ~sized firms. Size, in the Aston analysis,. was a greater 
determinant in larger firms in part because the size of the entity ,provides 
bufJ'ers within the system. These buffers include specialists, structures, 
and formalization (Gerloff, 91). 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) identified two significant elements of 
organization structure in their work involving high performing 
organizations. The original study compared and contrasted high-
performing organizations in differe':lt environments. The result was 
" ... an increased understanding of a complex set of interrelationships 
among internal organizational states and processes and external 
environmental demands" (Pugh 1984, 87). The two identified elements 
were differentiation and integration.- . 
"Differentiation is the difference in cognitive and emotional 
orientations among managers in differe:t:tt functional departments, and 
the differences in formal structure among those departments" (Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967, 8). 
"Integration is the quality of the state ofcollaboration that exists 
among the departments that are required to achieve unity of effort by the 
environment" (8). 
Thus, while there are departmental differences both in the managers 
as well as the purposes (e.g. finance, manufacturing, research), there are 
both formal and informal "mechanisms" which, by design, integrate the 
efforts of otherwise contrary (or dissimilar) perspectives. These devices, 
summarized in Figure 4, provide a ·means to meet organizational· goals, 
reduce or resolve internal conflict, and foster the ability ofthe organization 
to meet the demands and ·limitations ofits environment. 
Fig. 4 'Integrative Devices in Three High .-performing Organizations 
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Figure 4 Reprinted from D. S. Pugh, Editor, Organization Theory, Second 
Edition,~Penguin Books, London, 1984'), p. 91. 
It may be that the most significant aspect of the work by Lawrence and 
Lorsh involved the articulation of a contingency approach within a systems 
framework. As contemporaries of James G. Miller (1965), they summarize 
their work: "These findings suggest a contingency theory of organization 
which recognizes their. systemic nature. The basic assumption underlying 
such a theory, which the findings of this study strongly support, is that 
organizational variables are in a complex interrelationship with one 
another and with conditions in the environment" (Pugh 1984, 104). 
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Perrow (1970, 66-85) .proposes a technology-based analysis of 
organization structure based on two considerations: variability of input and 
understanding of the employed process. 
Variability of the input is divided into two kinds: uniform and stable or 
non-uniform and unstable. If the input from the environment is assumed 
to ·be always the same in nature, kind, size, composition, frequency of 
arrival, and so forth; then it is deemed' to be uniform and stable. If it is 
subject to variance in these ways, it is assumed to be ·unstable. 
If the process employed in transforming those inputs into outputs is 
well understood then the "search" for methods is analyzable. If, however, 
the process is subject to significant variation or is one-off in nature (see 
Woodward), then the process must be "created" anew each time and the 
search is considered unanalyzable. 
Tiie resulting four box· diagram from this analysis is shoWn in Figure 
' ' . . ,- ' ' ; .. ~ ', ' ' ' . ' ' . ~ ' : - ,, ' 
5. The Weberian bureaucra~cy occupies the lower left corner of the diagram, 
the Woodward. one-off firm ·occupies the upper right position .. Between 
' ' 
these two poles can be seen the possibilities for positions available on the 
. ' I , : - . - . 
Burns and Stalker 'continuun:i between inechariistic and organic forms of 
organization. 
In his later work (1986, 259), Perrow posits a power conception of 
organization, "Power, as used here, is zero-sum, relational (over 
someone), exer.cised both inside and outside the organization, an output of 
organized activity that is valued and an output that is produced only at 
some cost". 
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Figure 5 Technology and Or&anization Structure 
Froin: C.l'errow,ganizational AnalySis: A Sociological Yiew. Brooks/Cqle, l970. 
He summarizes his arguments (260-262) within three propositions: 
1. Basically, an organization is a tool that masters use to generate 
valued outputs. that they can appropriate. The most .essential theory to 
explicate this is ·bureaucratic theory .... This theory emphasizes 
hierarchy, specialization, formalization, and standardization. 
Nothing is as important as the master's ability to imperatively specify 
and coordinate the work of employees, The formal structure of the 
organization is the single most important key to its functioning, no 
matter how much it may be violated in practice, the violations 
themselves ·reflect the constraints ofthe formal structure. Imperative 
coordination is achieved primarily through direct controls {orders, 
associated with hierarchy) and bureaucratic controls (standardization, 
specialization, and formalization). Bureaucratic theory, based on the 
work of Max Weber ... is the single most essential element of a theory of 
organization. 
2. The first and most major qualification of the bureaucratic model 
is, as discussed in Chapter 4, bounded rationality: shifting and 
unclear preferences, limited information, and limited knowledge of 
cause and effeCt relationships. 
3. Given bureaucracy with bounded rationality, the next most 
important qualification is group usage; as distinct from individual 
usage ofthe organization by masters and employees. Group usages 
are internal and external (and may reside inside or outside of the 
organization). 
Hage (1980) continues the systemic notions articulated by Lawrence 
and Lorsch by examining organizations based on the variables of means 
and output. His work is focused on establishing propositions and 
corollaries which may be examined at multiple levels, cross-culturally, or 
inter-organizationally. 
These propositions are based on the analysis of the means and output 
variables. The organizational means van,ables are (265): 
Complexity (specialization): The number of occupational 
special ties, level of training required. 
Centralization ~hierarchy ofauthority): Proportion of jobs that 
participate in decision making, Number of areas in which decisions 
are made ·by decision makers. 
Formalization (standardization): Proportion of jobs that are 
codified, Range of variation allowed within jobs. 
Stratification( status system): Differences in income and ·prestige 
among jobs, Rate of mobility between low- and high-ranking jobs or 
status levels. 
The- organizational! ends variables are (2"65): 
Adaptiveness (flexibility): Ntimber of new programs in a year, 
Number ,of.new techniques in a year. 
Production ·(effectiveness): Number of units produced per year, 
Rate of increase in units produced per year. -
Efficiency (cost): Cost of output per unit per year, Amount of idle 
resources per year. _ _ 
- Job Satisfaction (morale):- Satisfaction with working conditions; 
.Rate of turnover in job occupants per year. 
Mintzberg (1979, 2) says "The structure of an organization can be 
defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which·it divides the labor into 
distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them". 
The most basic elements of structure are: " ... mutual adjustment, 
direct supervision, standardization ofwork processes, standardization of 
work outputs, and standardization of worker skills ... " (3). The 
"organigram" [organization chart] represents the " ... division of labor ... " 
and th~ ",. b!>undary .. " of the entity,:(37). 
• ' • J 
,':Spanpf control (unit size).s~emsto me to be a fl.mction of the 
variability and analyzability of the wo~k at hand" (40). [See also Perrow, 
. i 
1970]. " .. ~we wouJd! expect the operating core of the organization to assume 
a flat shape, the lpiddle line to appear .as a cone with progressively 
steepening sides, and the technostructure and more professional support 
units to be tall in shape" (147). 
The ideas are represented· in ,his later work (Mintzberg 1989) as the 
fundamental shapes of an organization typology. Configurations of the 
strategic apex, the middle line, the operating core, the support staff, and 
the technostructure define the nature ofeach organization (1989, 95-115). 
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In reviewing. the literature, Hall (1982) identifies the foHowing 
elements of organizational _struCture: . - . 
- size•(fl3) 
- technology (53) 
- environxnent(53) 
- choice and strategic choice (53, 73). 
- division oflabod54) 
- hierarchy (54) 
- medium of control (54) 
- practices and procedures (54) 
- complexity (horizontal and vertical differentiation, 
spatial dispersion) (82-87) 
formalization (95) · 
- centralization (114-118) 
- power and conflict (131-138, 152-153) 
- decision making (158-159) 
- communications (185-199) 
- change and innovation (208-210) 
He suminarizes: " ... (structure) is task allocation, exercise of authority, and 
coordination of activity ... " (310). 
In his review of the literature, Dessler (1980) identifies the following 
elements of structure: 
- environxnent; technology and size (Chapter 4} 
- decision making and communication (Chapter '5) 
departmentation and coordination (Chapter 6) 
- hierarchy and delegation (Chapter 7) 
- authority, control, and rewards (Chapter 9) 
Hicks and Gullett (1975, 45-102), in their review of the-literature, 
identify these elements of structure: 
- boundary 
- defined structure of activities 
- authority 
- centralization/decentralization 
- span of management 
- power 
- environment 
differentiation 
- technology 
- interdependence 
- integration 
Thus, we may say that the following represent a generic and at least 
minimal definition of the elements of organization structure: 
1) Boundary. Boundary represents a concrete,, actual, or 
conceptual/abstract separation between the organization under 
examination (or of interest) and its environment. Such a boundary must be 
permeable (open) ·so that matter-energy and information may be exchanged 
between the system and the environment. An environment is a 
prerequisite for a,boundary (Miller 1965, i978); 
2) Differentiation. Horizontal differentiation occurs when the 
organization requires the performance of more than one task or more than 
one task at .a time. Tasks, functions, geographies, markets, time, and 
populations all serve as foundations for horizontal differentiation [not 
necessarily in one organization, however]. The architectural perspective 
conducts its examination of organization· structure through such building 
blocks as horizontal differentiation oftask processes. 
Vertical differentiation refers to the distinctions in the scope of 
authority and responsibility within a group, unit, or department. 
Regis~red nurses, registered practical nurses, licensed practical nurses, 
and nurse assistants represent vertically differentiated roles, 
responsibilities, rates ofpay, and organizational'power (influence). In the 
maritime industry, vertical distinctions are made between those who 
achieve licensure (officers) and those who do riot (ratings). 
3) Integration. Integration is the cost of.organizational differentiation 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Differentiation permits each individual, 
group, unit, and dep~rtment to perform at a higher level through 
specialized education, training, or experience. The cybernetic perspective 
is that integration takes place through variety (of input available or output 
40 
accepted by the environment) amplification and/or reduction and through 
internal and~ external feedback. 
Centralization is the integrative process which places. the locus of 
decision making in such a position that the decider (Miller, 1978) has all or 
most of the requisite information available. Centralization reinforces the 
ideas of supervision and vertical differentiation. An added cost to 
centralization is that caused by the time lags. inherent in generating, 
processing, filtering, and forwarding appropriate information. 
Formalization is the integrative process whereby rules, procedures, 
and patterns are established so as to distribute the decision making 
process. · Formalization reinforces both horizontal and vertical! 
differentiation through pre-established parameters governing individual, 
group, unit, and departmental choi~e. An associated cost of formalization 
is that dispersed decisions do not always support the goals of related, but 
differentiated, subunits .. 
4) Conflict resolution. Every differentiated system at the group level or 
~higher, will eventuaily require a conflict-resolving ·structure. 
Differentiation produces incompatible goals 'between horizontal and vertical 
elements. In some instances the decider is the conflict reducer 
mechanism; in others, the structure includes designed elements (teams, 
task forces, departments, and so forth) to resolve conflict (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). 
5) Information generation and ownership. This element is related to 
the integrative processes of centralization and formalization in the nature 
of information transmitted vertically and, ~horizontally. Information levels 
and flows represent data concerning plans, goals, anticipated use of 
resources, and the exercise of power (choice). 
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6) Rewards. Rewards, and' the .distribution ·of rewards represent the 
power element in organization structure. Rewards are inade for long term 
and short term performance. · Rewards inay be at the individual', group, 
unit, or departmental levels and may consist of financial, psychic, or 
personal. perquisites. Rewards represent the appropriation and 
expenditure of such resources as funds, equipment, personnel, 
information, tiine, access to others, and distribution. Participation refers to 
the degree of shared decision making in establishing and distributing 
rewards. 
The Maritime Organization 
This generic listing of organization structure can be used to describe 
the modern merchant vessel. There is a horizontal differentiation, a 
vertical differentiation, a boundary, two primary integrating mechanisms, 
a power format, information flows, and a conflict resolving methodology. 
At the bridge-watch level, these same organization structures apply. This 
application of the elements is brief and does not include some of the 
experimental organization structures now being developed in Europe, 
Japan, and to a very limited degree, the United States. There have been few 
instances of change in the vertical dimension over the last 50 years. There 
have been a number of changes in the horizontal dimensions, particularly 
in Europe and in Japan, as alternative manning structures are developed 
and applied. 
Up until about 1850 all merchant marine vessels were powered by 
sail and the organization structure was based· upon a vertical 
differentiation. There were officers, petty officers or skilled sail-handlers 
and vessel crew members (Moreby 1975). An horizontal differentiation was 
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initiated in the age of steam when technical experts, capable of managing, 
operating, and maintaining steam boilers and propellers were needed 
aboard vessels and navigating officers did not have those skills. This 
horizontal differentiation has since been institutionalized through unions, 
Coast Guard regulations, ship ownership organizations, and other 
national and international structures. 
The modem vessel in the United States is differentiated into four 
horizontal departments. The deck or navigation department is responsible 
for navigation, ship handling, loading and unloading, and general ship-
keeping. The engine or technical department is responsible for the 
propulsion system, deck and allied machinery, and the maintenance of 
those systems and machines. The hotel or steward's department is 
responsible for food service and laundry. Many vessels continue to carry a 
radio officer as the fourth department, responsible for external 
communications. 
Th~ modern vessel is differentiated into three or four vertical levels. 
The highest level con~ists .of the captain, or master, who bears the legal 
. ' 
•' I , ' · . i 
responsibility for the safety and efficiency of the vessel. ·Each of the 
departments is led and managed by pffic~rs w~ohave received specialized 
training, completed the required levels of experience, and have been 
examined and licensed by a governmental body. The third vertical level 
includes skilled and experienced individuals in each department 
(wheelsmen, bosuns, engine repair specialists, etc.) who perform 
specialized duties under the direction of the officer group. Typically there 
are also some unskilled or semi-skilled ratings in each of the three 
departments who work under the direction of the skilled, non-officer, cadre. 
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The boundary in the operations of the merchant marine is clear. It is 
a physical, concrete boundary: the skin of the ship. tJt is permeable through 
the acceptance and discharge of cargo, fuel, stores, and personnel. It 
bounds a relatively self-contained system interacting with its immediate 
physical environment (Wind and wave) and its societal environment 
(marketplace, ship owner, cargo owner, etc.). 
The vessel itself, when underway, also performs part of the 
integrating function (as well as serving as the bot.mdary) .. The freedom of 
all on board is circumscribed by the vessel. No one can go home at the end 
of the day, bowl with another social group, or avoid an intolerable work-
mate through a spatial separation. Rather, the vessel precludes these 
opportunities and forces the crew to rely l1POh its resources except in the 
most unusual circumstances (coastal grounding or the like). 
The captain ~s the ihuman Integrating force, ;supported·1by the chief 
engineer and the officer cadre. His [there are still very few women in this 
position] role is to coordinate the actiVities of the horizontal differentiation 
and to assure safe passage of the vessel, its cargo, and crew. 
Information flows in many informal as well as forlllal patterns. As 
with many small groups of people, the rumor mill is always active. Since 
the vessel is both boundary and integrator, information may flow swiftly to 
all through alarms and other devices. 
There are three levels of reward (power). There. are specific and 
detailed legal requirements demanded by various international and 
national organizations regarding standards of watch-keeping, pilotage, 
and acceptable norms of ship-keeping and operation; many recent additions 
concern the discharge of pollutants into the world's oceans, rivers, and 
harbors. The vessel owner has established a reward structure which is 
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carried ;out by the .captain, and to a lesser extent by the chief engineer. The 
captain also produces a level of,power which is absolute within the 
limitations established by the owner, ·the national regulatory agencies; and. 
the international regulatory agencies. 
Conflict is resolved through decisions· in the vertical hierarchy. 
li>ifferences of opinion or disagreements are carefully managed by the 
parties-involved. They are not brought to the surface except in unusual 
circumstances. Resolution is almost always through the vertical 
hierarchy: skilled rating, officer, chief engineer (if in the technical 
department), captain, owner/union representative, national/international 
regulatory agency. There are limited structures available for conflict 
resolution at the horizontal interfaces; these conflicts are usually also 
resolved through the vertical hierarchy. 
The bridge-watch of today's vessel is clearly bounded by the physical 
limitations of the bridge (or pilothouse) as a physical structure. 
Differentiation is by role, typically one or more watch officers, perhaps a 
master, a pilot, one helmsman and one or more look-outs. Military vessels 
' -
will have additional pez:sonnel on board. SmaU~r coastal tra,ding vessels 
would likely have .a captain, a helmsman and perhaps a watch officer. A 
I -
tug or ferry may have only one person ·standing the bridge-watch. 
Integration is through the tasks to be performed; und~r pilotage 
- . ' 
conditions the captain is the integrating mechanism when he has the conn 
[piloting control of the vessel). Information may be differentially spread 
among the bridge-watch. In pilotage waters the pilot has the expertise of 
the geography and waters, the master has the expertise of the vessel. 
Power resides with thl;l master with the exception of the Panama Canal in 
which the power resides with the pilot. 
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The Near-miss Ex,perience 
The near-miss experience has been identified as a potential source of 
learning in the maritime industry for a number of years. The first attempt 
to codify the near-miss experience from the perspective ofthe bridge 
organization was conducted during 1979-80 :by Det norske Veritas, the 
vessel classification and inspection society in Norway. The framework for 
the project, which was entitled Cause Relationships of Collisions and 
Groundings, established the near-miss experience as an included part of 
the primary research (Drager 1979). 
Specificaliy the project established a near-miss reporting form 
(Drager 1980) as a means for members of the merchant marine and the 
maritime community to report near-misses as a source of data to the 
project team. 
The response to that request was "uninspiring". Drager (1989), in 
the final report for .the Det norsKe Veritas project in 'collisions ·and 
groundings on page 31 provides an analysis of near-misses. 
The number ofnear-misses at sea is not generally known, but 
on the basis of comments from ship masters and navigators it is 
presumed that a certain number of situations arise that could lead 
to collisions and groundings:, . 
These near-misses represent a valuable base ofempirical data 
from which worthwhile knowledge can be gained as to how the 
casualty was avoided or information about hazardous areas of 
fairway or inadequate marking of the area, etc. 
Near misses also constitute an important data basis for the 
understanding of the casualty process. Potential causal factors 
contributing to the casualty are often factors or conditions that are 
present to a greater or lesser degree during all marine transport 
operations and not only in the cases where a casualty takes place. 
Collection .of data on near-misses .can therefore provide insight into 
the potential causal factor.s, and' if one makes a comparison with 
situations that led to the casualty one-can possibly identify with the 
most critical factors or conditions thatlead to the casualty. 
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The project team rec~ived twenty-four near-miss reports and the 
results were .similar to those of the over-all project statistics~ '!1he section on 
the near-miss concludes by sayi,ng, (31) "Near-miss reporting ought to be 
viewed in connection with the recommended reporting system outlined 
previously, where the need for such reporting is pointed out, In the 
meantime, however, it is important that such near-misses ought to be 
discussed more systematically among the navigators, so that they can learn 
from the errors that have been made." 
The near-miss phenomena was clearly seen as an i~portant 
contributor to understanding .the causes of collisions and •groundings in 
that project. Unfortunately the response rate was so low that no. data was 
published about the nature of the near-miss phenomena or its frequency.· 
Nor was there a methodology .established to continue near-miss reporting 
and to. share the results with the maritime community-at-large. 
The United States Department of Transportation in 1984 determined 
tha:t a maritime safety reporting prograril patterned after the aircraft safety 
reporting program [both voluntary] might be.an appropriate tool for 
assisting in improving safety and reducing hazards to navigation. The 
Department of Transportation at the Transportation Safety Center in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts established a one year trial program to solicit 
observations. oferrors from th~ industry. as reported in Safety at Sea, 
August 1985; p. 3. Two types ·of errors were solicited: hazards ~aids to 
navigation) and practices· (operating situations). The one year · 
experimental project was terminated on May 31, 1986 and a project report 
was issued that fall. 
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One near'-miss story is reported on page 1E2 of that finall report: 
The following summarizes the particularly poignant situation. It 
seems that two vessels :had been navigating on the high-seas after 
midnight on nearly parallel tracks, within sight of each other, for a 
few hours when the reporter determined'·the tracks were on a 
collision course. 'The vessels closed to the point where -the other mate 
could •be clearly seen on the port bridge. The reporter :signaled the 
other vessel twice to fall astern with a. negative reply each time. The 
situation ended with- emergency action· on the part ofboth vessels. 
The impact apparently was so .imminent that the reporter has· relived 
it many times -- prompting .the following closing coinment in his 
report: ... instructed helmsman to ease course to port 1 degree or 2 
degree at a time to prevent throwing stern into opposing vessel ... 
other vessel was seen belching smoke with sharp turn to starboard 
and stopped. I then resumed and continued on course (and worried 
over this for the next ten years) ... 
While the report may:be stale, the reporter has certainly captured 
the intent of MSRP (Maritime Safety Reporting Program). 
The reporter added that he was hesitant to change course or speed 
because this would require notifying (and therefore waking) the 
master or chief engineer. He wondered if the mate on the other 
vessel was operating with similar motives. 
The project framers had hoped to generate between 250 and 500 
responses in a twelve month period. Only 220 responses were received and 
of those some forty were not usable (26). The project was terminated by the 
Department of Transportation and has not been reinstituted. 
OlfMamholt (1983, 44) says: 
, I . ' , ·. . 
· The.r,e'have been several attempts to solve the;probiem:of:how to 
collect more usefUl i'nforinatibn on risk through incident or "near-
miss" reporting systems of various kinds. These systems have in 
almost all cases failed to operate for any significant period of time. 
Some of 'the reasons for this are: · · ' · · ' 
* The person involved in the incident or the near-miss situation 
must himself take the initiative:, to write a repor:t, which might 
concern, for him; embarrassing situations •Or adinissions. 
"' The person who reports has prejudices. In a national• reporting 
scheme, out of forty reported cases of. bad conduct of other ships all 
but one were of foreign nationality. 
"' It is impossible to verify the statements made. 
These other attempts are not identified nor cited by Mamholt. 
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The most .recent. references to·the ile~t-miss experience were in 1988" .. 
89. Robert Hershey,' writing in Maritime Policy and Management (April~ 
. June 1988, 141-146) reports .. an incident in 'his research• of the "~ .. intimi-
dation effect in near-collision. The chief mate and master were conning the 
vessel through an ·anchorage n~ar the entran~ to the Sabine River, Port 
Arthur, Texas. The chief mate, deferred to the·mastet even though the 
mate clearly knew the vessel was out of the anchorage and· cutting across 
the ship channel thereby nearly colliding with a vessel in the channel. The 
master mistook the vessel's lights for something else~· (143-144). 
Hershey also describes a second near-miss, in this case a near-
grounding. "The second mate knew the charts were in error; channel 
buoys had been moved but the chart had not been corrected. The mate 
deferred to the master who did not believe the mate thereby ignoring the 
mate's knowledge .. The mate remained silent" (144). 
Habberly (1989, 10) describes •as a near-miss situation the 
circumstances in which action by one ship can cause a collision when no 
collision would have occurred but for the action of the first ship. This 
suggests that vessel actions cause near-misses. He conducted a number of 
interviews with mariners in a study of collision avoidance behavior and 
was told "a near-miss can shake you up a lot", "you have to learn from 
near-misses every one tells you something", "''m probably a lot more 
conscious as a result ofnear-misses and surprises" (10). 
The near-miss is apparently a regular and personal experience in 
the maritime industry. Near-misses are remembered over a long period of 
time and form the background for one~s .professional development. There is 
some agreement in the industry .that near" misses could be the source of 
learning andimprovement in the industry but that the two formal attempts 
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have.not been able to carry-on or provide• much useful data. The near-miss 
.phenomena, as·.examined in this thesis,is based upon an organizational 
structure within a bridge-watch, within an industry, within the framework 
of a large organization. The. critical elements have been identified and 
placed within that overall context. 
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CHAPTER3 
METHODOLOGY 
In the beginning there is description. Detailed, descriptive 
case studies are usually the jumping-off point for the study of new 
areas in the social sciences. . .. much anthropological research is 
descriptive, deliberately setting out to.create a rounded picture. of the 
entire culture or some broad aspect of it. In economics the industry 
case study continues to be· done long after economics has left its 
infancy.... Descriptive research does not create la,ws and conclusions 
that apply beyond the subject matter described (Simon and Burstein 
1985, 37). 
Yin (1989, 16-20) identifies five alternative research strategies: 
experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case .study. He 
suggests that a case study is appropriate for research questions asking 
. - . , .. 
"how" and "why", when no cont~ol overtbehayioral' events.is required and· 
~ ' . . -
when the focus is on contemporary activity, 
The purpose .of this research i's .to describe the near-miss experience 
in the words of those inv,olved; to identify ways in which the organization 
' . 
may have changed to produce a near-miss rather than an accident. The 
research recognizes the richness of the experience and does not find fault 
or blame regarding shiphandling or pilotage performance. It does not 
require control over behavioral events nor does it require internal 
experimental replication. 
Yin defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that " .. .investigates 
a contemporary phenomena within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and 
in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (23). 
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According to Yin (46-59), case studies may he either single or 
multiple· case designs and1 either holistic or ew,bedded. A multiple c~se, 
holistic design (type 3) involves multiple cases, each one independent (not 
embedded) in the others. TJle. writ of analysis remains the same for all the 
case descriptions. 
Yin describes the multiple case design as one which includes 
replication rather than sampling logic. He· compares replication logic to 
multiple experiments (53). He says, "The logic underlying the use of 
multip,le case studies is ... selected so that it either (a) .predicts similar 
results (a· literal •replication) or (b) produces contrary results but for 
predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). Thus, the ability to conduct 
six or ten case studies, arranged effectively within a multiple case design, 
is analogous to the ability to conduct six to ten.experiments on related 
topics; a few cases (two or three) would be literal replications, whereas a 
few other cases (four'to six) might be designed to pursue two different 
patterns of theoretical replication. If all the cases turn out as predicted, 
these six to ten cases, in the aggregate, would. have provided compelling 
support for the initial set of propositions, If the cases are in some way 
contradictory, the initial propositions must be revised and retested with 
another set of cases. Again, this logic is· similar to the way scientists deal 
with contradictory experimental finding (53c54). 
The case study research described herein is based on the near-miss 
experiences of ten professional mariners. These do not necessarily include 
all of the possible experiences of any of the individuals, nor do they include 
all of the possible near-misses at a particular location or given time. The 
experiences are not expected to be representative of experiences of those 
persons nor of that location. 
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'The objectives, of the study are to identify and capture the detail of 
near-miss stories in such a way .that the organization structure and 
process of the bridge-watch and the individual mariner might be. exam1ned. · 
The study's 'basic question 'is to dete~ne in what ways, to what degree, 
and why did the reporter, as a professional mariner, step out of the normal 
structure of the organization of the bridge-watch and do something 
different that turned a potential accident into a near-miss. It is .proposed 
that one or more of the following (independent and' mutually exclusive) 
events occurred which took the situation out of the normal organization 
structure. 
1) The captain or another watch officer opened the door for an 
alternative structure. That is, the captain or senior watch officer present 
turned to another member of the bridge-watch and said words to the effect: 
"What do you think is happening, what shouid we do"? 
2) Someone else on the bridge-watch stepped forward and 
stepped out of the role required by the vertical or horizontal differentiation 
and drew the attention of the watch officer or captain to the situation. 
3) Th,e fear of the potential accident overcame the fear of the 
' • ~ I ' - . ' 
master's reprisal (see Hershey 1988) and someone stepped out.of the typiCal 
structure. 
4) I\ peer relationship between captains or watch officers was 
the foundation for the ~hange. , ,' I 
5) A prior relationship existed between one or more members 
of the bridge-watch and that prior relationship was the foundation for 
change. 
The unit of analysis for this research is a given bridge-watch in a 
given situation. It is assumed that there was a higher than normal degree 
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of stress in the situation which required changed or modified patterns of 
communication and coordination. The content of the study includes the 
bridge-watch itself; its composition, number of people, skills, background, 
the instrumentation and electronics available to that bridge-watch, and the 
vessel itself. The context includes other vessels, shore structures, other 
environmental objects, and the weather. 
Crano and Brewer (1986, 324) in discussing the American 
Psychological Association Committee on ethical standards say" ... 
recruiting subjects for such research (social science) on the basis of 
'informed consent'- (must be such that) the participation'be voluntary, and 
with the volunteers' full knowledge of what participation will involve." 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1981, 487) say "Adherence to the principle of 
informed consent will enhance the freedom of participants to choose 
whether or not to take part in a research project and will guarantee that 
exposure to kno~ risks is undertaken voluntarily," 
A second ethical consideration is described by Crano and Brewer 
(334), "Thus, the ·ethical consideration of any researcher in this area (social 
science) must include who will be privy to this knowledge in the long run, 
. . . 
and what are the chances that it will come under the exClusive control of 
one segment of the social system." Nachmias and Nachmias (490-491) 
suggest that this consideration is part of a greater issue of privacy. They 
provide three perspectives of privacy" ... the sensitivity of information being 
given, the setting being observed, and dissemination of the information." 
A third ethical consideration is anonymity which according to 
Nachmias and Nachmias (492) " ... requires that the identity of individuals 
be separated from the information they give. In other words, a participant 
is considered anonymous when the researcher or other persons cannot 
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identify particular information with a particular participant. If the 
information is given anonymously with the researcher unable to associate a 
name. with the data, than the privacy of the participant is secured even 
though sensitive information may be revealed." 
The final ethical consideration concerns confidentially which 
Nachmias and Nachmias (393-394) discuss: " ... participants. in social 
science research are commonly told that the information they provide will 
be treated as confidential; that is, that even though researchers are able to 
identify a particular participant's information, they would not reveal it 
publicly. Although investigators have a strict moral and professional 
obligation to keep the promise of confidentially, there are circumstances in 
which it may be difficult or even impossible to do so. One of the most 
important of such situations is when information is subpoenaed by judicial 
authorities or legislative committees. In the data collection stage 
participants should be given clear, accurate statements about the meaning 
and limits of confidentiality." 
These four issues are fully addressed in this methodology. First, all 
participant respondents are volunteers. The original request for volunteers 
was sent to all current masters· and first class pilots who are members of 
MEBA-AMO District 2 (AFL-CIO) and are sailing on the United States 
'Great Lakes. Those· who responded in the affirmative were provided a 
~ ' ' . / 
second' opportunity to decline·to relate their near~miss experiences. During 
the interview the researcher reiterated the voluntary nature of the 
. ·. 
' '· ~ . ' 
conversation and all reporters were given the opportunity to decline to 
participate. Copies ofthe correspondence are included in :appendix 1. 
. . 
All data generated by this project will be available under appropriate 
circumstances for use by other researchers. It will, however, not be 
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available by name ofindividual to protect confidentiality. Data will not be 
made available to any governmental orjudicial body regarding practices, 
actions, or thoughts of any ofthe participants. 
Anonymity cannot be offered to the participants since. the data 
require that the researcher know their identity and some of their 
background and .experience. The researcher is pledged to keep those data 
confidential and to report all near-miss situations under code names 
and/or numbers which are not available. to others. Confidentiality will.be 
maintained and data will not be made available to legislative or judicial 
bodies. 
The willingness of.individuals to participate and to fully share their 
experience is indicative of the trust in which they hold ·the researcher and 
the importance to which they give to the project. Such trusts are accepted 
with humility and understanding of their fullest meaning. 
The methodology employed in this case study is of the guided 
interview type (Patton 1982, 162-169). The basic framework for the 
interviews is the same and is described in the protocol as interview format .. 
There are seven major topic areas to be covered: 1) the introduction and 
purposes, 2) the demographics of the interviewee, 3) the environment at ·. 
. ' 
the time of.the near-miss, 4') the organization of the bridge-watch including 
current and past practices, 5) the technology and equipment in use, 
' ·. 
6) a narrative ofthe situation itself, and, 7) personal conclusions by the 
interviewee. . 7 
Patten strongly recommends that data from an interview be tape 
recorded, transcribed, and reviewed and commented upon immediately 
following the interview. Concerning the recording of data he says (179) 
"The purpose of qualitative interviewing is to understand the perspective 
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and the experience of the· people being' interViewed~ But no matter what 
style of interviewing is used and _no matter how carefully one words 
interview questions, it all comes to naught.ifthe interviewer fails to capture 
the actual1 words of the person being interviewed. The raw data of 
interviews are the actual quotations spoken by the interviewees, There is no 
substitute for ,this data." 
All ten reporters agreed to the use ofthe. tape recorder. Concurrent 
notes were made including drawings,. descriptions of events, and points of 
·emphasis by the reporters. The tape recorder malfunctioned during the 
interview with the tenth reporter and an expansion of the researcher's 
notes was immediately made. The recordings have been transcribed and 
are reproduced, after editing for clarity, accuracy, a,nd extra comment, in 
Chapter 4. The cases are presented in the order they were given by the 
reporters. No .attempt.has been made to delete cases, nor to arrange them 
in any particular pattern. 
Three pilot interviews were conducted in preparing·for the data 
gathering. The first pilot interview was conducted with a senior Great 
Lakes master. 'The purpose of that pilot was to review question formats and 
to· test the use of the tape recorder. The second pilot interview was 
conducted with a former naval captain. The interview was not tape 
recorded but extensive notes and charts were developed. The third 
interview was conducted using the finai draft of the interview format and 
recordckeeping form. It was not taped at the request of the interviewee who 
is a senior Coast Guard officer. The three pilot interviews have created an 
interview format which is open and fleXible yet covers the essentihl 
elementS needed. The results of the pilot interviews are not included in the 
research report. 
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The protocol for the research, including the interview 'format and 
questions is in appendix 2. 
. .. 
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CHAPTER4 
CASE REPORTS 
Ten professional mariners related near-miss situations for this 
work. They are identified as First through Tenth Reporter. The 
experiences of each are identified as stories and ·are numbered beginning 
with First for each reporter. The stories are presented in the order they 
were told. Some of the reporters made explanatory or aside comments 
which are recorded in parenthesis. In a few instances brackets have ,been 
used to supply additional detail of a technical nature or to clarify a point. In 
order to maintain confidentiality, only limited biographical data is included 
for each reporter. Where appropriate, photocopies. of NOAA charts are 
. reproduced as Figures 6- 23 and are located at the end of this chapter. 
First Reporter 
This reporter is 43 years of age. and has been a mariner for 19 years. 
He was licensed as a First Class Pilot in 1975 and as a Master in 1989. He 
most recently sailed as a reiief captain/first mate. 
First Reporter, First Story 
My first near-miss experience was .as a brand new third mate in 
1976. I had probably only been on my license a week; maybe only three or 
·: . -
four days. We were north bound from Burn:s Harbor in J:.ake Michigan. I 
was brand new and scared· to death. 
We left the breakwall and the captain left the bridge. It 'hit me like a 
ton of bricks. BANG- you've got it. The responsibility ofit all really hit me 
- I was scared' to death - I was responsible for the whole thing. 
Well, about three hours into the watcha car ferry_was crossing the 
lake-ahead of me .. I went "Oh my god, there;s one out there!" I got him on 
' ' ' . ' I ' 
the radar,abouttwenty-eight'lnile~ away, and i .plotted him. He was 
showing me the 'green light' so I had the right of way. 
i - ~ -
i couldn't. touch the Chadburn [engirie1 order telegraph/speed 
control]. If I had checke_d he_r ~own,[slo:wed~' the Captain would have been 
. ' . . 
in the pilothouse, grabbed me by the scruff of the neck, and thrown me over 
the side. l could have changed course two or three degrees but that would 
have made no difference; a course change of ten or fifteen .degrees, or even 
more, is required in a close situation. 
He crossed our bow and probably cleared by three or four miles. I 
just had my heart in my mouth because from up there three or four miles 
doesn't look like anything at all. I had an experienced wheelsman and he 
didn't pay any attention to it (he may have been laughing at me the whole 
time) - I was sweating it out by myself. 
Now that I'm a Captain, I lay out the ground rules right away to the 
new guys. I say: "Look, if there~s any situation at all check the boat down 
immediately. Don't be afraid" -and I tell them the story of my first watch. 
I tell them check it down to neutral if you need to, and if it still looks bad to 
start a significant maneuver and then to call me. 
00 
First Reporter, Second Story 
Light 13 in the St. Clair River ·is bad in that: it is the first turn into the 
River proper. The Sailing E>irections, (McSweeney 3rd Edition, 8) say: "Do 
not meet anyone at Southeast Bend (light 13);'. 
This near miss situation happened in Hecember 1990 between a 700 
foot vessel up bound and! a 630 foot vessel down bound at.Southeast Bend (see 
Figure 6). I was sailing as first •mate on the downbound vessel. It was at 
night, with reduced visibility due to haze; visibility of a mile or two, I 
suppose. 
The vessel reporting system gives us advance notice of other nearby 
traffic in the St. Clair River. We can plot about what time another vessel 
. . 
should be at a location and he can do the same for us. Thus, Close calls cim 
be managed between the involved vessels. As the downbound vessel, we 
had the right-of-way. 
He reported at the St. Clair light and .at 'Light 2' (X32), We assumed 
it would take him about twenty~ five minutes to Clear the Bend at Light 13. 
Well, either he had lied about when he was at Light 2 or they had checked 
· down or something because I was absolutely sure that I had .planned it to 
let him come out ahead of me. 
As long as he's not in the turn itself (has completed the turn) and is 
on the next straight stretch, meeting is no problem. So to assure that, I 
checked my vessel down. I reported at the Salt Dock which is about.an hour 
before we would normally get there. I knew we were going to be down there 
pretty close to the same time so just to make sure I checked it down at the 
Salt Dock to make sure•he gets.out of the way. 
Well at Light 23 it.only takes me twelve to fifteen minutes to get there 
61 
down-boun& I don't know what happened -maybe he did: the same thing 
on his part. Until we could see each other, it was too late to do anything and 
we knew we were going to meet right there where it's not good. And 
basically that's what happened. 
I had a brand new wheelsman - it was his second or third trip. He 
didn't know the river at all and was going strictly on my rudder 
commands. It would have been easier to grab the wheel myself rather than 
try to give him direction. We met right there.at Southeast Bend and we 
couldn't have missed him by more than fifty feet. Instead of:hugging the 
red buoys up-bound, which would have given us a little room, he was pretty 
much center channel - as if nobody was there. This forced me to darn near 
swap,paint with the green buoys coming down that side. I had to go way 
over toward the American side- way off-center. My concern as I started 
my tu~ to the right to go down the cut-off was that my port-quarter [stern] 
was going to swing into him and that's what we just cleared. I got on the 
channel and said "Thanks a lot (vessel name)." He never responded.· 
First Reporter, Third Story 
Southeast Shoal is the trallic hub of Lake Erie. Near misses occur on 
a daily basis. You don't use the radio at Southeast .Shoal- nobody talks to 
each other. Some of the newer guys (since 1985) will communicate but 75% 
of the people won't call. You are embarrassed to use the radio. 
There are some twenty courses that converge at the Shoal. I've seen 
as many as seven vessels there within two minutes of each other. And, of 
course, there are usually a number of smaller fishing boats there, too. You 
are supposed to be able to handle it without radio communication, without 
talking. 
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This is my 1976 story: we were west 1bound, from Buffalo· (Long Point) 
through Southeast Shoal (see Figure 7). The visibility was horrendous- ~less 
than a mile. It was summer, hazy, misty, night time of course. This is the 
southeast shoal where you don't call anybody. If you can't take it through 
the southeast shoal, you aren't a navigator, 
There wasn't a whole lot of traffic around. From the way I was 
coming it really didn~t matter a whole lot for anybody else .that was upbound 
because I was showing them the red light - I was far to the north on the 
approaching course. We were running a good fifteen minutes ahead of two 
following boats. I didn't see anybody .coming down bound. · 
Then, at twelve miles I picked up another target on the radar, right 
at southeast shoal and the target was too big to be the traffic buoy. I thought 
it was a downbound vessel at the buoy making his haul right there at the 
buoy; so I watched him. Keep in mind· that radars work best in clear 
weather. In heavy fog they only work for three to six miles and it was one of 
those nights. I wasn't trusting the radar at all until I got at least inside the 
twelve mile range, 
Time passed and.the target hasn't moved- it's still ~there. Whatever 
it is, it's dead in the water butits too big to be the buoy. 'I was under 
tremendous pressure not to call 'the old man'; I had to prove myself. 
(There was very little communication with tne captain and myself as a new 
third mate. After all, he had his own side of the boat- the starboard- and 
you couldn't walk down that side. That started to change with the 'baby 
boomers' in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Now it's mostly all gone). 
We got within about six miles and I flipped the radar to .the closer 
range [from twelve to six miles]. I was sure it was another boat- it had 
moved a little from the twenty-four and eighteen mile scales but I couldn't 
m 
be s.ure if it .was underway or not. I broke the· code of silence. I .called and 
called and called~ at least four times- probably more-no answer. We were 
close enough to flip the radar to. the six mile scale. I' was sure it was a ·boat ~ 
it had moved a little from the other scales (twenty-four and: eighteen miles). 
I didn't know if it was under way or not - couldn't tell, couldn't raise them 
on the radio. 
Now I didn't know which way to go around the guy. I didri't know if 
I should haul up a little and go around the outside of him or just assume he 
was stationary and squeeze between him and the one red• buoy that:s there. 
So I gave up and I called the 'old man'. He knew we had to be in.some 
trouble. I told him there was a situation I didn't understand - he was there 
right now! 
(When you call.the captain to the bridge you give him the facts and 
shut-up, you don~t offer suggestions. There can only be one captain of the 
boat. He might ask your opinion on options and you should respond 
truthfully. But when a mate calls the captain to the bridge you have given 
up control of the bridge to the captain and you speak when you are spoken 
to. The chain of command, the things that maintain some semblance of 
order have to remain intact or there would be total chaos. The slightest 
argument over a navigation situation when timing is critical - there just 
can't be any of that, we can't have that at all. One person - one chief. He 
has the ultimate responsibility so he makes the decision. Even if you are 
100% absolutely sure that you have the solution - you keep that solution 
inside you unless he asks. 
(There is only one exception. That is when the mate has sailed as a 
captain he can judiciously offer suggestions when a captain is stewing 
abo.ut what to do. The first time I did this it was very tentative and I was 
Si 
glad that I didn!t get chewed out over it. ·Even today, after I've sailed: as 
captain, another captain will never ask what .I' think. I expect him to take 
my suggestion With respect, but not necessarily to act on it. 
(Sometimes as Captain, I will think out loud about my alternatives; 
as much to help me hear the solutions as to receive ideas from others. 
Then I would look at a mate and ---- nah, I wouldn't ask them. Once last 
year I was first mate and a captain asked what I thought about a non-
critical situation. My reaction was: "Why ask me? You, are the Captain," 
Of course, he had bumped me from t~e captain's job on that vessel.) 
The captain looked at the situation and the target on the radar and he 
couldn't figure it our either. He tried to call- no answer. l:ie said: "Head 
[steer] right up on it" - so we headed right on this thing. We were probably 
about a mile and a quarter from them, going full-speed; the vessel I was on 
is no longer in service but she was faster than most. He said:"bet's check it 
out - lets see what it is". 
We got less than a mile from him and the captain was in the radar 
and !'was irt the window with the bi~oculars .. l·saw his ~chor lights and 
saw no running lights. I blurted out: It's a vessel! 
It was a salt-water vessel at anchor. . Apparently he had some sort of 
' . 
trouble or something. We never did find out why he anchored on the east 
si~e of.the traffic buoy·so he was blocking the·buoy's radar return from 
' upbound vessels. 
We passed so close to him that I was afraid of the angle of the anchor 
chain- the water is only thirty feet deep there. We passed within one 
hundred feet- you could have thrown a baseball over. My hair was 
standing straight up. 
ffi 
I· would have gone left and given a wide berth around· him, but the old 
man after he made sure that it was an anchored vessel; hauled right and 
squeezed in-between him and the red buoy. After being out there for twenty 
years I would do the same thing today but I would have checked the boat 
down to half -speed at five miles away and doWn to neutral at three miles to 
check out the situation, especially his anchor chain. I can nolonger 
remember what the wind might have been, South would have been okay, 
but North and we could have gone over his anchor chain. 
First Reporter, Fourth Story 
In 1986 or 87 we were upbound in the. St. Clair River just past Stokes 
Point coming up to Recors Point (see Figure 8). It was a Saturday 
afternoon, just after lunch, perfect visibility, not. a-cloud In .the sky. I was 
at the conn of a 630 foot vessel. We had been following another vessel that 
was going well below the speed limit in the river so we wanted to pass. This 
is one of the. very few places in the St. Clair River where it is safe to pass 
another vessel. It's critical that there be no downbound traffic and that you 
are up. to,date on the traffic situation, · 
Everyone in the pilothouse had been monitoring the channels for the. 
river traffic and we were absolutely convinced that there was nobody 
coming downbound. You can just' blow the whistle' to pass and that's all 
you legally have to do. But you always call the guy up and tell him you'd 
like to pass because most everyone will usually get over to the side and give 
you a little more room. Also when you do that you usually ask them, 
"What's it look like up around the corner?" You try to verify from him that 
you can make it. 
First of all he has to let you pass because he can make it miserable for 
you by goingjust as fast as he can to make,.the passage as long and drawn-
out as ,possible. Or nine times out of ten they'll check"down and let you get 
passed and then they go back up to their regular speed~ And then if there's 
anything that looks as if it may be dangerous they will ,Jet you know, they 
can see farther up the river. This guy that we were passing also thought 
that there was no one coming downbound. So he.ok's and says he'll get.over 
on the right side and let us get by. We .asked about down bound traffic and 
·he indicated that there was none in sight. 
, , Now we're comin,itted~.and we~re ·going upbound right smack in the 
nlidclle of the downbound course, gding ~s· fast as we can to get around. 
Right at the critical point when our bow is up and in-past his stem so we 
can't drop in behind him there's another freighter coming around the 
corner downbo\ind. ·('rhe Recors Power Phmt blocks any view of any 
·' ; . : . . ·, . 
downbound traffic.) 
Who ever this vessei was it's unbelievable that both us and .the vessel 
we were passing missed any calls of his to the traffic information cen,ter at 
Sarnia. I can't believe that we both missed it, so ~ur thought is that he 
never called in or perhaps he left.one of the docks in the.areaheaded 
downbound and never called Sarnia and let them know. Rather than a 
regular downbound passage off of Lake Huron, he may have been in the 
river system already. 
At any rate neither one of us knew he was coming and neither one of 
us could see him. The river is.fairly wide at that point but when you get 
three boats abreast all at once it's a lot of boats plus, you never know what 
the other guy is going to do because the downbound vessel has got to make a 
snap decision right now as to which way he's going to go. The most 
fJl 
prudent thing is .to split the two of us. That minimizes the effect of sucking, 
prop wash, etc. Nobody knows what he is: going to do. All! the decisions are 
made and' there~s no communication. What we tried to do at that point was 
to wait to make sure what he's going to do. It's the downbound vessel that 
makes the split-second decision because he's looking at two boats coming 
up at him and nowhere to go. You have to go with your gut feeling right 
now. 
When the downbound vessel (who had the right of way) saw the two of 
us coming he bl\.rrted out, "111 split between you." It was instantaneous on 
his part - he probably had a heart attack when he saw us! But, at the 
moment he decided to split between us we were too close together, he would 
not haue fit. So we had to alter our course closer to the American side just 
to give him some room to get between us. We hauled .left and the over-taken 
vessel was already right as far as he could get. The downbound vessel 
could have.hauled hard right and taken us both on one whistle; he had 
room to do that. 
We got so close to Recors Point at the north end of the power plant 
dock there - within fifty feet of the shore. None of us ~ould' believe that there 
was that much water there! We were giving .him as much room as possible 
and it was on' a turn so all the boats were turning at the same time. I would 
say we came within 175 feet of him and he got within less than 100 feet of 
. 
the boat that we were passi'ng, We were absoltitely amazed nothing 
happened. 
Maybe the downbound vessel wasn't monitoring the channel. I don't 
know what caused this because we were talking back and forth about 
passing and he should have been monitoring the traffic information 
system. He was a lake vessel, not a salty. He should have gotten on the 
ffi 
radio so there wouldn't have been two of us coming at him. He didn't even 
have his radio set to Channel 11. He was just as surprised as we were. It 
was very, very close all the way around because of the swing on the curve. 
It was just coincidence that we should meet there, but good luck that the 
downbound boat made an immediate decision - it avoided a wreck. 
Second Reporter 
This reporter is 49 years of age and has been a mariner 30 for years. 
He was licensed as a First Class Pilot in 1965 and as a Master in 1971. He 
most recently sailed as a captain. 
Second Reporter, First Story 
Last year I had a near-miss coming downbound through the ice, 
toward the Poe Lock (see Figure 9). We were between Big Point buoy and the 
coal dock. It was daytime, the weather was clear on a bright day in early 
spring. I was captain of a 1000 foot vessel. We had slowed down and were 
waiting for an upbound salt water vessel who was coming out of the locks. 
We had it pretty well timed for him to get out clear and then we would 
be following his track going in. The 1000 foot vessels do not always 
penetrate ice very well. Many times they will shear right or left along the 
face of the ice depending on the thickness of the ice and the forward 
momentum of the vessel. This is a somewhat unpredictable event. 
I had my vessel moving quite slowly and he was building speed to get 
through the ice and get out to the Lake [Superior]. We got within two 
thousand feet of each other and he was trying to get out of that slush ice 
when both of us started shearing left. We went left. He went left. He got 
clear of the ice the same time we did and talk about close, we came bow to 
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bow within fifty feet. We were in contact with the pilot on the other boat and 
we both cut her back and stopped. 
I said, "Are you backing, are you backing?" and he said, "Yeah, I'm 
backing, I'm backing." Then we both started to back up and I sat and 
waited for him to go around me. It was just pure luck that we were both 
going slow enough that we were able to get stopped. 
Second Reporter, Second Story 
It was mid-October at about 1700 [5:00P.M.] and just starting to get 
dark but not yet dark. We were upbound on a 1000 footer with an after-end 
pilot-house approaching the Blue Water Bridge at Port Huron/Sarnia (see 
Figure 10). The watchman in the bow (with a walkie-talkie) let me know 
that there were two small boats downbound under the center span of the 
bridge. They were about sixteen to eighteen feet long and in the middle of 
the bridge. 
I started my right turn and sounded a danger signal. They didn't 
move so I slowed up the rate of turn a little bit, turning right a little bit more 
slowly and blew them another danger signal and they started waving. I 
blew them a third danger signal and at that point I had to steady the boat up 
[stop the rate of turn] and when I steadied the boat up the current got her 
and took her left. 
The boat came left because of the current coming in from Lake Huron 
and caught the bow and swung it over to the American side. According to 
the bow watchman, the bow was grinding on the bottom on the other side of 
the bridge by the motel. The after end came within six to twelve feet of the 
walkway along there. The antennas on the roof of the pilothouse 'clicked' 
on the bottom of the bridge we were so far over from the center. 
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A few seconds later I got her to come right. I kept her hard left to 
swing the stem out into the current and she walked right away and right 
out in the river. We let out the anchor after we reached Lake Huron and 
waited until we were sure we were making no extra ballast, then went on 
up to Taconite Harbor for an ABS and Coast Guard inspection. There was 
no damage. 
There were two hundred to three hundred people out on that pier 
[walkway]. We came into that bank at seven to eight mph. One minute we 
were out in the middle of the river and the next we were coming right onto 
that pier. We were one hundred feet off and the next minute we were 
twenty-four feet off, then twelve, then six, and then she stopped coming in; 
and people just stayed on that pier. 
We had a description of the two boats and their names but not their 
numbers. There were eight or nine people aboard those two boats. They 
went right under our bow; they expect us to get around them but we can't. 
The Coast Guard did not pursue it as far as I know. 
I could talk all afternoon about sail boats and fishing boats in the 
Detroit River. One time they had the entrance completely blocked and I had 
to circle around because I couldn't get into the river. 
Second Reporter, Third Story 
Another one at the Blue Water Bridge (see Figure 11) on a 1000 footer. 
I had a second mate that sailed for years. Downbound, one time he waited 
too long to start the turn - up underneath the bridge, the left hand turn 
there. I was on the bridge. It was a typically foggy day. My mind just 
wasn't on what he was doing; maybe he was talking. But as soon as I saw 
the problem I jumped right into the action. 
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By the time we got it under control we were thirty-six to forty-eight 
feet off that bank that goes around by the pilot office where the light ship is. 
We were right off that and the current took us down to the right to the 
American shore. We were getting bank suction so we just shut the 
starboard engine off. Anytime you're too close on one side or the other like 
at Rock Cut you just shut the close side engine off and your main 
propulsion is right down the middle of the vessel, almost. 
At Rock Cut by the green rock pile I've had my stern off the bank by 
only eighteen feet. We just shut down the one engine. That always helps us 
move away from the bank and into the middle of the river .. · 
When I have control of the boat and I wait too long to start a turn 
some mates (even third mates) will speak up and say something like: "I 
never wait this long to start this turn" while others won't say a word. I 
sailed up through the hawse-pipe with a captain who would act as mate 
while I made the dock- but he was an unusual captain and I sailed with 
him for many years and learned a lot from him. It depends on who they 
are but that's why we have two guys up there - to watch for things like that. 
Second Reporter, Fourth Story 
Another real close one: coming into Two Harbors (see Figure 12), 
1000 footer, wind southwest twenty-five to thirty, and a five to six foot sea 
coming right into the harbor. It had not been blowing that long [in time] 
because the swell was still quite small. We were getting a pretty good swell 
inside. I was talking to a guy on another 1000 footer and he says in that 
case just back in. Take it up into the wind, get the wind on the bow, and 
start your turn to the right a bit early. Turn early - the sea should knock you 
down right to the dock. 
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We came in there okay; backed in beautifully. As soon as I started 
her right I knew there was something wrong because we started coming 
out - the swell wasn't pushing us in any more, it was pushing us out. She 
just kept coming right, we couldn't get her to go left at all even with the 
thruster or reverse engine it didn't matter she just kept coming right. 
The swell has an effect - it comes in, goes around and goes back out 
that breakwall. There is no other place for the swell to escape that enclosed 
harbor. Well, we dam near came back through that breakwall sideways! 
We missed the number one dock by six feet. It was as close as I ever want to 
come; my whole body was shaking and I was physically drained. 
We let her keep coming right and when she came around we went in 
forward, aimed for the dock, dropped an anchor and just pivoted on that 
anchor in a hard left to the dock. After we made the dock, my mate said, 
"Captain, I never saw a more beautiful dock than that. How did you plan 
all that?" I just started laughing. I looked at the green side of the 
breakwall and the waves were moving parallel instead of being calm on the 
inner face. 
Second Reporter, Fifth Story 
Another near-miss I had was at the Mackinac Bridge. We were 
downbound, toward Chicago on a 1000 footer in mid-summer (June or July) 
with zero visibility due to fog. Just past the Mackinac bridge we got a call 
that there was a diver down, doing survey work, between the bridge and 
White Shoal see Figure 13). So we caught him on the radar and came to the 
left to clear him. 
We had another target come on the radar to the left of him. It was 
something coming real fast, like a small airplane and it bounced- boom, 
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boom, boom right across the radar set. He was clearing us by a lot and all 
of a sudden he stopped. Dead. Then all of a sudden he started coming 
toward us. We were coming left and kept coming left cutting in front of 
another downbound boat, a 630 footer. 
It was a twenty foot aluminum Coast Guard boat with two ninety 
horsepower outboard engines. It was not the 'crash boat' but it has radar 
and a radio. We kept trying to call him from the first time we saw him but 
there was no answer. 
When my lookout saw him from the bow, he was right down below 
our bow and our bow wave pushed him to the side. The two guys that were 
with him were out on the stem ready to jump. He was so scared he 
couldn't get the engines going to get away from us. As soon as he was clear 
of us we had to come hard right to clear the other large vessel. 
After we had gone on a couple of miles he called us and said, "I 
wanted to come on over and hear your whistle real close." I reported this to 
St. Ignace Coast Guard and they would do nothing so I called Group Soo [U. 
S. Coast Guard]. They said they would do something but I never heard any 
more about it. 
Third Reporter 
This reporter is 40 years of age and has been a mariner for 20 years. 
He was licensed as a First Class Pilot in 1975 and as a Master in 1984. He 
most recently sailed as a captain. 
Third Reporter, First Story 
The situation occurred in about 1977 when I was the third mate, 
standing the 0800 to noon morning watch, aboard a 650 foot vessel. This 
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occurred in the summer months. It happened within the first fifteen 
minutes of the watch, about 0755-0805 [7:55-8:05 A.M.]. The vessel was 
approaching the St. Clair River at Sarnia and the Blue Water Bridge (see 
Figure 11). The captain was on the bridge and had the conn in Lake Huron 
summer fog. 
The captain was in the front window with his radar off to his left. 
The mate on watch, me, was maintaining the radar watch. Generally, in 
fog in the rivers the Captain will stay in the front window and the mate on 
watch will keep a radar lookout. Then there is an interplay between them 
to confirm ranges, bearings, contacts, and so forth. It is very hard for a 
person to go back and forth between radar and fog because of the light 
patterns and the need for 'night vision' in the fog. (This is less true with 
some of the new daylight radar screens). 
(This incident occurred prior to the establishment of the Sarnia 
Traffic Center. At the time all vessels were required to make 'security' 
calls at the Marysville upper dock (Stag Island upper), at the Polymer Plant 
and at the traffic buoy. It is very possible that this would not have happened 
if the Sarnia Traffic Center system had been in effect. Although that is not 
to say that it isn't possible for such a situation to happen even with the 
Traffic Center as it exists today.) 
No traffic had been reported nor had any security calls been heard for 
upbound traffic. There was no disagreement between captain and first 
mate, whom I had just relieved, about the traffic situation: no upbound 
traffic. There were some two or three following downbound vessels behind 
us. 
We were a little above buoys 3 and 4. I observed a radar return on an 
outbound course moving quite rapidly toward our vessel and I believed that 
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it was a false echo. Such false echoes, pips, and ghosts are typical in fog 
and in this area. I begin to be convinced that it is a vessel upbound and not 
a false return. 
But we don't know of any upbound vessels so, with a great amount of 
caution I mumble something about a vessel, in an attempt to get the 
captain's attention without speaking directly to him about what I thought 
was a vessel right about at buoys 1 and 2. I just can't be sure. (I was 
reluctant to tell the captain that there seemed to be an upbound vessel 
approaching, based on our age difference and the captain-third mate 
difference. I was questioning my own judgement; I had only been on my 
license a year or two.) 
He looks into the radar and then out the window. Just at that time 
we can see that it is a saltwater vessel upbound. He is steering across us, 
not on a 'one whistle [port to port] encounter'. He is steering to the right of 
us outside the channel. We were on the right side of the channel and 
couldn't go any more to the right without grounding. 
The captain then picks up the radio and just yells, "Hard right, hard 
right, hard right". At the same time he told our wheelsman to turn hard 
right. The wheelsman had frozen so I jumped over the rail or went under 
it, I don't remember. I pushed the wheelsman out of the way and turned 
the wheel hard right. 
Shortly after we saw their range lights start to move to the right -
headed back into the channel. Just about the time our bows get right off 
each other we are steering clear of his stem and he's barely steering clear 
of our stem and our bows are right next to each other. 
The captain picks up the radio again and yells, "Hard left." I believe 
the other vessel responded, "Hard left." I don't recall him answering the 
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first hard right but he may have. I then put our wheel to hard left and at 
that point the wheelsman took over again. In essence we did the Welland 
Canal movement. 
I keep asking myself why wasn't the salty on the radio giving 
security calls? Three vessel following us never heard him give any calls 
and were surprised that there was a salty in the area. It was like there was 
a ship that came out of the fog. I really thought it was a head-on collision. 
You can't come any closer than this without it being a collision. I was sure 
that we were going to be involved in a head-on collision. 
On reflection we all blamed the salty. Perhaps he had not made the 
appropriate security calls. Perhaps he had exchanged pilots inside the 
River and there was confusion between the new pilot and the master. 
Maybe he didn't have his radio set right and the new pilot discovered it too 
late. 
The only thing that kept this from being an accident was the captain 
announcing his intentions to the other vessel in such a way that the other 
vessel could take the appropriate actions. Of course there was a chain of 
events happening: change of watch, security calls, reduced visibility, radio 
errors, and so forth. 
[At no place in the regulations does it require, or even suggest, that 
the captain call out steering directions to the approaching vessel or indicate 
in any way his intention. Quite clearly the captain took command of both 
vessels when he made the move to signal his own intentions and to 
encourage the on-coming vessel to make the appropriate simultaneous 
moves.] 
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Third Reporter, Second Story 
This concerns a downbound trip on a 600 foot vessel in the Detroit 
River enroute to the Rouge Plant (see Figure 14). It was to be a normal 
night passage and expected docking. I was the mate on watch but I was not 
in the pilothouse at the time since my role was to accept the mail from the 
mail boat and to be port side watch [call off distances during the turning and 
docking maneuver]. The Captain had the conn. The first point at which I 
realized that something was amiss was when I looked aft and saw several 
of the crew members standing around the after cabins with· their life 
jackets on. The captain had blown the general alarm but all I had heard 
was a little jingling noise. I did notice that we were somewhat close to the 
American side of the River. 
We had checked down and as we passed opposite the Sterling Fuel 
Dock (on the other side of the River) a tug and barge left the Fuel Dock and 
attempted to turn down river using left wheel to turn in front of us. 
Approximately half-way through the turn the current took control of the 
vessel and its forward movement was perpendicular to us because of the set 
of the current. We just kept creeping closer to the American shore, initially 
at several hundred feet to eventually within forty-eight feet of the shore. 
He stayed perpendicular to us as he travelled at the same speed we 
were moving. We reached the point where our bow cushion pushed his bow 
away and the two vessels started to move parallel down the river at as little 
as twenty-four and up to fifty feet apart for about half a mile. 
I felt that most likely the two captains were in communication with 
each other and it is likely that the captain of my vessel used the bow-
thruster to move our vessel to starboard but at the same time to set up a 
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cushion with the bow-wave to hold off the tug. The tug came within twenty-
four feet of our midships before it began to turn. Our captain checked down 
further and once control was regained the tug moved to port and then on 
down river. 
A normal maneuver would have been to cross the River and then 
make the turn on right wheel from the American side. Had he done this, 
checked it down and then given it a kick it would have gone right around. 
A consequence of this situation was that our master produced a 
written report of the situation and forwarded it to the proper authorities. 
This was a ship handling mistake on his part. The captain of the tug was 
relieved of his responsibilities the following season. I do not know under 
what circumstance, or how, the tug barge was identified nor what may 
have happened in the pilot house. 
Fourth Reporter 
This reporter is 40 years of age and has been a mariner for 19 years. 
He was licensed as a First Class Pilot in 1978. He most recently sailed as a 
captain. 
Fourth Reporter, First Story 
This incident occurred during November on Lake Michigan. We 
were northbound offRawley Point (see Figure 15) on the Wisconsin side of 
Lake Michigan heading for the Straits of Mackinac. I was the captain of a 
150 foot tug with a 400 foot barge in tow. The barge was in ballast. 
The incident began at about 1915 hours [7:15P.M.] when I came up to 
the wheelhouse a little early to relieve the first mate. (Tug captains often 
stand a regular watch. There is no wheelsman on watch). The visibility 
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was about ten feet (horizontal) on a very dark and foggy November night. I 
spent a few minutes with the first mate discussing the vessel position, 
weather, other traffic, the state of the tow and so forth. A 700 foot lake vessel 
was south and east of our position also heading northbound and outside of 
our position. We had been following the eastern shore of Wisconsin about 
three miles off the beach in order to avoid weather on Lake Michigan. 
There is a false echo which shows up regularly off Rawley Point 
I have seen this return from a number of different positions on the lake 
and from more that one vessel. The false echo was on our starboard 
quarter, about six miles away. 
I was getting ready to make my move to go across the lake and was 
concerned that no other traffic would be nearby. The first mate indicates 
that there has been no radio traffic of nearby vessels and the only return on 
the radar is the false echo. 
At approximately 1930 [7:30P.M.] we hauled ninety degrees to the 
right to sail a course 090 degrees for the Michigan side of the Lake. I went 
to the chart table (which faces aft) to measure off the distance and time to 
the Michigan landfall and to establish my position with a Loran fix. As I 
was measuring off distance and time to landfall in Michigan I turned off 
the red lamp and looked up to my left. 
I saw a whole string of white lights which I first thought was the 
beach. Then I realized there could be no beach because visibility is ten feet 
and I'm heading for the middle of the Lake and what I saw was the 
decklights of a vessel passing in front of me. 
I was filled with terror; there was no doubt in my mind that I will hit 
him and I think this is the big one now. He was coming at me at an angle 
but enough .of him was across my bow and· there was no. doubt in my mind 
that I was going to hit him. How in the hen could: this have happened? 
My immediate thought was to. t~rn hard left .to parallel the other 
vess·el and·:strike it a glancing blow ~d"ships: My tug is heavily reinforced 
forward for ice penetration so I might put a hole in him (causing him to 
sink) but· I woUld save my own ·vessel. 
I learned a long time ago that you have to give the guys down below 
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[your own crew] a chance to get out even if it· means putting yourself in 
more peril, you have to give them a chance. So rather than making a turn I 
reached for the .alarm - sounded the alarm about ten or fifteen times in 
rapid succession, yelled down the .stairs - you have to give your crew time to 
get above decks and .to get on the survival suits. 
I turned and faced forward. In giving my crew a chance to get out on 
deck in survival suits, the time gave me a new perspective on the situation. 
The crossing vessel was moving very rapidly from starboard to port. A turn 
to the left (my original thought) would have produced a square-on hit to his 
mid-ship· position. His stern is now about four points ,[forty-five degrees] to 
my starboard [reporter's right] and moving rapidly. My view forward is :of 
deck lights, deck pipes, hand rails, and hull. We are about fifty feet apart. 
The. first mate came up in time to see. the last three or four seconds of 
the situation and exclaims: "God, it's a ship!" I responded in the 
vernacular affirmative. I started a left turn which meruit a ·hit square-on 
and immediately changed my mind to a right turn and turned hard right. 
We were now fifty feet from him, he is off niy starboard bow and we are 
closing rapidly. I braced myself for the impact. We are how about ten feet 
apart. 
In a flash we are under his stern and clear of him. 
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A tug is often at the mercy of its tow and a primary rule is to 'always 
know were the tow is and what it its doing' since about eighty-five percent of 
all tug accidents involve the tow hitting the tug. I have completely lost 
. . 
sight oHhe •barge; I donlt' know where it is. or whaHt is' d~ing. I asked the 
' ' - - - . 
first· mate where the tow was to make sure .that the tow. was not going to 
turn us turtle. The m.ate used ,the •search lights and found the barge off our 
starboard quarter with e:v.erything just fine. 
There was no com.JnUni~ation or coordination b.etween me and other 
members of the bridge team except to solicit status of the tow. I did not 
coordinate With the other vessel, nor did I attempt to communicate with 
that watch officer later. 
My first reaction was a great deal of shaking and fear - much 
adrenalin in the system. The first mate had no matches to light.his 
cigarette so I tried to light his .cigarette for him. I was -shaking so hard that 
J set his beard on fire. I was shaking so hard and I told him to light his 
own cigarette. After a half-hour or so the shaking stopped and I was angry 
at the other vessel for ctossirig in front of us; someone was not pa~ng 
attention. I never spoke to the .other vessel about the incident. 
This situation stayed a near-miss because I first gave my crew a 
chance to prepare for a collision. In the time it took for me to warn them, 
I 
the whole situation changed. My original choice to turn left was obviously 
wrong and my actual turn to the right was the only safe alternative. Had I 
turned left, we would have hit the other vessel and likely holed her. The 
barge would have probably run over the tug a few moments later. The other 
vessel would likely have suffered a serious breach ofher watertight 
integrity and may have sunk. 
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Fourth Reporter! Second Story 
This second story concerns 'a· situation in-which the tug had a loaded 
barge in tow on Lake Michigan, southbotind for Chicago. It was a mid-
December morning about 1030. The weather reports this past.season have 
been either early or wrong. This was a wrong weather situation. 
The weather forecast was for Winds Southwest at ten to twenty and 
waves ofthree to six feet. We came out from behind the lee of the Islands 
(North Manitou) and the actual weather wa:s a southwest wind at about 
thirty knots with four to eight foot seas as we came out of the lee of the 
Islands [in northern Lake Michigan]. The barge was approximately twelve 
hundred feet aft of the tug on a two inch steel' cable. 
By 1400 [2:00P.M.] the wind 'had increased to forty-five mph from the 
southwest and the seas were at eight feet with a few at ten to twelve feet. 
The mate on watch called me and we agreed to check down to fiye ·miles an 
hour. By then we were over half-way across the Lake, heading for the lee of 
the Wisconsin shore, with about four hours of running to the lee shore. 
The 'tow machine' is a very large deck winch which controls the 
cable to the tow. As the tow-line comes from the tow machine there is a 
frame over the stem of the tug called a 'dutch bar' which the cable rides 
over. A device called a torpedo is a piece of metal which is attached to the 
towing cable and rides on the dutch bar to prevent cable wear. The torpedo 
is attached to the cable by two large cable clamps, one at each end. 
At about 1'500 [3:00P.M.] one ofthe·clamps on the torpedo cameloose. 
The torpedo started rattling and banging. By then the waves had• risen to 
twelve to fifteen feet. The third mate called· me and so I decided to take a 
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look. I put on my survival suit and 'work the haridrwls' to the· after 
steering station where I can look down and see most ofthe stem and· what 
is happening. Most of the stern is under water, apparently from the 
pitching. 
· · ldecided that we would have to re-clamp the torpedo and then let out 
the rest of the available working cable, a total of fourteen hundred feet. In 
order to do that we have to' slow down to steerage, bring in ten feet of.cable to 
remove the torpedo! let out two hundred feet more cable, and then .re-attach 
the torpedo at the dutch bar. This was done safely, in spite of the weather. 
At the watch change 1930 [7:30P.M.], I relieved the .first.officer who 
indicated that he had been slowly bringing the vesset: to. the right to get out 
of the trough and to reach the lee shore of Wisconsin. We were steering 
about 225 degrees and making about 208 degrees true. As I began my sweep 
of the situation; I also attempted to keep adding a bit of 'right' to the auto -
pilot when I realized that the Loran was indicating 180 degrees; due south. 
Obviously something was wrong. The gyro was set to 225 degrees to 
make 208 degrees good. I .turned on the white lights .and discovered that the 
~steering stick' is in the hard right position. It should have been in the mid-
ships position. The gyro indicated steering 170 degrees. Based on .the 
earlier incident, my first act was to alert the creV{ to the situation; to give 
them time to prepare for emergency actions. 
The first mate immediately returned to the pilothouse, as did the 
chief engineer. I explained the situation to them: the rudder is hard right, 
we keep adding right commands, and we keep turning to the left. I turned 
offthe auto-pilot and the non-follow-up and attempted to test the steering. 
The rudder position indicator answers but it does not stay in position, 
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apparently there is a malfunction in the hydratU.ic ram system that holds 
the rudder .. 
We were losing steering, at which point :I sounded the alarm and 
called the Milwaukee. Coast Guard station to alert them to the difficulty. At 
that time we were sixteen to twenty miles ftmn the Wisconsin shore. This 
was an information call which described the situation and our location, we 
were not requesting help. 
The Chief took a detail of men aft to take a look-see. When they got 
aft, they discovered that the stern water-tight compartment was flooded. 
There was no way to put a man into the compartment, nor to put a pump in 
place. There was no water in the engineroom, nor any indication that there 
was water in any other compartment. 
At this point the barge was winning the 'contest' between tug and 
barge. The barge was dragging the tug into the trough and our motion was 
changing from pitch to roll. I sent a deckhand aft with a torch to be ready to 
cut the towing cable if that decision was made. ·In thirty seconds two things 
happened: the engineroom called to tell me that there was water entering 
the engineroom and the mate on watch told me that the steering had been 
lost. 
Instantly I had the deckhand cut the cable; ten seconds later it was 
gone. Then we used the little steering remaining to 'head for the· beach'. 
I called the. Coast Guar.d and told them that we were abandoning the 
tow .and would appreciate sorite help getting· into Milwaukee. The crew 
gathered in the galley, in survival suits, each with his own treasure: 
walkie-talkies, sandwiches, cigarettes, snickers bars, flares, and so forth. 
The: tug. has radio control of~e anchors on the barge and I let out 450 feet of 
chain and an anchor from the forward end of the barge to prevent it 
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sweeping, onto some shore .. It also had, of course', fourteen hundred feet of 
two inch cable trailing from the bow. 
At about six miles from tne !beach, we met With a ·Coast Guard vessel 
which took us in.tow to Sturgeon,Bay. 'J:'he Coast!Gua.rd broadcast the 
' ' . 
position and description of the barge for other traffic. (The barge has a 
generator and was fully lighted at the time.) Once tied up at the Coast 
Guard station we opened the after compartment and_ pumped it dry in 
minutes. The packing around the rudder shaft had loosened allowing 
some water to enter the compartment. The primary source of the water, 
however, was one of the dogs on the hatch had broken and the other two had 
loosened in the pouriding. 
The steering had been lost because a fuel hose, stored in the 
compartment, had sheared an hydraulic v,alve which kept 'back pressure' 
on the steering system. Within thirty seconds the fault had been found and 
the valve was quickly replaced. 
A sister tug went to get the barge while we laid on a new towing 
cable. Two days later we took the barge back in tow and finished the voyage, 
~he decision making process included conversations between the 
captain, the chief engineer and the first mate in establishing the 
emergency procedures to be followed, the attempts to find the fault with the · 
steering system and the nature of the flooding of the after compartment. 
Those conversations, of which there were probably several, were primarily 
between the captain and the chief engineer. 
I believe that a vessel needs to be highly organized, efficient; but that 
it needs to stress continuing personal and organizational education. I 
conduct a regular weekly meeting with the entire work group (twelve 
people) to discuss ideas concerning seamanship, safety and practices 
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aboard the vessel. That meeting is not required and not demanded' by the 
fleet office. I feel• that the meeting is descriptive ohhe characteristic of the 
vessel as open and accepting of ideas. It is .also a :ve~sel on which the crew 
does not drink nor do drugs on board the vessel. 
I feel that part of the difficulty is that ~he vertical .structure can 
reduce the sharing .of observation and experiences .between the more 
experienced and less experienced officers and that reduces the education 
an:d learning opportunities. An individual in a very rigidly vertically 
structured vessel does not have the opport~ty to cultivate the learning 
when working for st.~:ch an absolute controller. 
Fifth Reporter 
This reporter is 32 years of age- and has been a mariner for 4 years. 
He was licensed as a First Clai)S Pilot in 1986. He most recently sailed as a 
3rd mate. 
Fifth ~porter, First Story 
At 0745 .[7 :45 A.'M.) I picked up the watch bet~een Pelee Passage and 
Colchester Reef. We were upbound on a 1000 footer in the spring of the 
. . . . I ' . 
year. Visibility was reduced due 'to thick, heavy fog. Our unloading boom is 
two•hundred fifty·Jeetlong and we could not:see the end of it; call the 
. ( . . . ·' . 
IJ I • 
visibility two hundred feet. 
We were heading for East Outer Channel (see Figure 16); the captain 
and the first mate both wanted a half hour notice for the Detroit river 
system. I had my AB [able-bodied seaman] clear the anchors early - I felt 
the captain would go to-anchor rather than try to make the Amherstber 
Channel which follows the East Outer Channel in such heavy fog. East 
fJl 
Outer Channel is very wide·(700 feet) but the Amherstburg is a very narrow 
channel, 'one hundred fifty feet, With a lot ofcurrent. With a H)OO footer, or 
any other vessel, you just can't go straight up the channel, rather you have 
to crab to allow for the set of the current. Most buoys are cleared :by only 
forty to fifty feet under normal circumstances. 
There was a downbound small tanker that would meet us aroun:d 
East Outer Channel, light 1/buoy 2. There was at least one other lOOOfooter 
upbound behind us. 
The captain and the first mate came to the bridge and the captain 
decided he was .going to take it up. I was monitoring one radar and the first 
mate was monitoring the other. The captain would periodically glance at 
the radars. We informed the captain of bearings, ranges, and approximate 
ti~e to targets including buoys as we approached the East Outer ChanneL 
The captain gotin touch with the downbound tanker and they worked out a 
one whistle passing, normal procedure. 
As we approached the channel, a.mile from light 1, the captain. took 
the conn and brought her over about twenty or thirty degrees to starboard 
from our standard course. This way he approaches. the channel on a ;bit of 
an angle untilthe red side (buoys) lines up and then he usually ·brings the 
vessel right over on the standard upbound course (McSweeney, 2) and 
heads up the channeL As we approached .the red line~up (we are observing 
this on radar, which effectiveness diminishes in fog) we had the radar on a 
low-scale and it was picking up targets fairly welL. 
As the red side lined up on the radar th~ first mate informed the 
captain: "You are on red side line-up'!; but the captain didn't start his haul 
' ' 
as usual. The mate said, ;'¥ou are past the red line-up." The -captain still 
didn't make his haw. The 1st mate said, "The ffiiddle of the channel is 
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coming in line" - at this point we were ~ past our starting point for .the 
turn. The downbound tanker was now about a half mile to three-quarters .of 
a mile away. We were giving the captain all the information about the 
approach to the channel and the meeting situation at hand and hejust 
wasn't responding. (I don't know what he was thinking - I don't know 
what he was doing. Sometimes it's easy to get disopented in the fog.) 
The first mate finally' said, "You are past the, middle of the channel!!" 
The captain finally started to bring the vessel over but he only put ten 
degrees ofright rudder on which makes a very slow turn. At this time the 
captain of the downbound vessel, the tanker, came on the radio in a state of 
' - -
panic and said, ,\What are you doing? Are you going to make a turn or 
what?" And our captain replied, "We're starting the turn now'' but it was 
excessively late to start the haul. 
We started calculating feet between the approaching vessel and ours 
on the radar because it appeared a collision was imminent We visually saw 
the tanker pass our stem at no more than.sixty feet away. It mayhave .been 
closer, The tanker, attempting to avoid a collision, was forcedoutside the 
channel; he was just trying to get out of our way. Had it been a deeper 
draught vessel he wouldn't have had that.option. Our lookout on the bow 
claimed that we passed within ten to fifteen feet of the tanker. He was so 
scared that he started running and sprawled face down on the deck. 
Now we still had to go up the Amherstburg Channel and the captain 
finally realized that he just couldri't do it because the visibility was just too 
poor. We got half-way up the East Outer channel and he had to make a 180 
degree turn and get out of the system. It took a while to turn in the 
channel, back and fill, to get out of the system and go to anchor. 
The Coast Guard had told us· the fog was thick and we have trouble 
enough going up the Amherstburg Channel. in broad daylight. It:s not · 
hard but you're on your toes all the time because on a 1000 footer you have 
buoys in front of you that youjust don't see (be,cause ofthe l€mgth of the 
vessel and the position of the pilot's eye), you're fighting current changes, 
and you have considerable current-induced crab to the vessel. We were all 
shook up pretty good, even the wheelsman and the AB on the bow. The 'old 
man' didn't say anything about it and we couldn'.t say anything to him. 
(:At what point do I know, as mate, thafs it's time to step in and do 
something, when somebody else has the conn, and I see a serious situation 
unfolding? 
(Immediately, with any other mate. With a captain, there:s a very 
fine line because he is ultimately in. charge, he is ultimately responsible. If 
I pile that vessel up, he is still partially to blame. That's a very hard thing 
to answer because of the repercussions. If I stepped in and told the 
wheelsman "hard right" at that time when we were coming in the channel 
- first of all I'd lose my job immediately and there's a very good chance I'd 
lose my license.because t~e .Coast Guard is going'to step in. The captain is 
ultimately responsible even .jfhe is. putting the vessel irt danger- he is in 
charge. 
(With this particular captain you don't mention that he is making an 
error i~ judgement. He sho~l.d be taking oirr. input and using it to make the 
correct decision; it's not the job of the mate to tell him what the information 
means and to clarify your own concerns. Especially on an uptight vessel 
with as much animosity such as this one.) 
Sixth Reporter 
00 
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This reporter is 43 years of age.and has been a mariner for 25 years. 
He was 'licensed as.a First Class Pilot in1976 and as a Master in 1987.. He 
most recently sailed as a 1st mate. 
Sixth Reporter, First·Story 
We almost hit a weather buoy in 1982 up in Lake Superior off Manitou 
Island (see F'igure 17). The Coast Guard and NOA:A (National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adlninistration) placed weather buoys on 
the Great Lakes to monitor weather. 
The bake Carriers Association a number ofyears ago developed 
recommended courses. The one from Whitefish Point to Manitou is steered 
279 degrees from Whitefish to Chris Point and then 290 degrees from Chris 
Point to Manitou. There is. a· shallow point between Whitefish Point and 
Chris Point so. the 1000 footers don't steer that course. We come aroilltd 
Whitefish and we steer 291 to Manitou so we can stay a mile or two outside 
the shallow spot. It's a straight ·course, you save time and ralso your boat 
doesn't vibrate going over the shallow spot. 
NOAA had a weather buoy placed real close to the course line up 
near Manitou. So we come around, we punched in our LORAN C for a 
distance off Manitou of four n:iiles and· we steer that course. It was in the 
summertime on a beautiful sunny day and we could see thirty or forty 
miles. 
I was on the 4 to 8 watch. On this watch ifyou want to eat supper, 
you relieve the 12 to 4 mate a halfhour early and then he comes :back up to 
the wheel house and relieves you so you can eat. So I relieved the mate on 
the 12 to 4 at about 3:25P.M. and then he came back up at 4:20P.M. and 
relieved me for supper. It was a.deep water watch and everything was 
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clear - no other boats in the area, When I came back up I glanced at the 
LORAN C to see what kind of a course we~re making; we know the way 
points plugged in for Manitou. We were right.on course and we talked for 
a few minutes. I glanced out ofthe.comer of my eye and saw'that we were 
heading right on a large square buoy- a weather buoy. 
The buoy was seven hundred to.eight hundred feet dead ahead of us 
and I yelled, "Hard left!" The wheelsman was sitting in the chartroom 
reading a newspaper. He·was not within twenty-fi~e feet of his wheel. The 
- - . " 
mate that relieved me was just getting ready .to head downstairs and he was 
about eight ·feet from the wheel. He walk~d· ov:er to the wheel and put it 
. . 
about thirty degrees left wheel on it and the ship swung over and we missed 
the;weather buoy by about fifty feet. 
That's about a $100,000 buoy and that's as close as I've ever come to 
hitting anything. We were actually to the right of our course because the 
mate I relieved had incorrectly reset the LORAN at the relief time of 3:25 
P.M. (The new LORAN systems won't let you make this mistake). I made 
up my mind from then on to be more aware of ev:erything around me when 
I come on duty. Situations tend to occur at the relief point. Briefing your 
relief is important. I did report the weather buoy being in a poor spot. 
Nothing was done about it. 
(Two or three years later was the lOOth Annual Convention of 
Shipmasters in Alpena. I talked to a Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. who was. 
responsible for the placement of the weather buoys. Two or three days later 
he called me at home for the position of the buoy and the next year the buoy 
was moved out about ten miles from the course lines so we don't have to 
worry about it anymore). 
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Sixth Reporter, Second Story 
I had a situation with a salt-water boat. up on Lake Superior about 
1986, W,e were westbound headed for Taconite Harbor,(see Figure 18) about 
five rililes off the north shore; it was kind1 of hazy. I was second mate 
sta_nding the 12 to 4 day watch. When I first can:ie .on watch the radio was · 
on and I checked to make sure the volume was up. (Sometimes they're · 
turne.d down because of, the radio chatter)~ I· heard a salt water boat :giving 
a security call leaving I>uluth eastbound. Toward the end of my watch, 
about three o'clock it was getting foggy and I picked up a target on the radar 
about twelve or fourteen miles away. 
I put the cursor on him to check his line of movement. I watched 
him for about ten minutes and I saw that we were holding a bearing, so I 
tried to call him up and I got no answer. I tried to call him again and 
again there was no answer. At this time he was about eight miles away. I 
came right five degrees figuring I woUld go ahead ofhim. He was over on 
my left side ('I'm showing him my red light) so by pilot. rules I should hold 
my course and he should go underneath my ·stern. I made my course 
change to. the right and he did the same thing - he made a course change to 
his left. So 1 still have my cursor on and the .bearing is still the same - he's 
heading right on me - collision course. 
We're down to about six miles distance now. I'm watching him close 
now and I'm starting to get a little concerned. It's foggy, we're blowing our 
fog whistles. I tell the wheelsman to come right fifteen degrees more. The 
target comes right again and matches me and is still coming right on me. 
I don't know who it is and I try to call him again and there:s no answer. 
Then I recall that on the early .part of my watch I heard this salt water boat 
leave Duluth and make a security call. I figllre from where we're at and 
from the speed of the salt water vessel it:could'be him. 
So I thought to myself, this glly's not ans:wering me, he~s acting kind 
of naive to navigation rules. And I thought to myself, this is a .salt water 
boat and they do not have a pilot in the wheelhouse - they have someone in 
the wheelhouse who does not understand English ai1d he is putting me in 
jeopardy. I'm about three and a half to four miles from him now, it's about 
3:20 in the afternoon and I ring the old man's room ~<l tell him to· come on 
up. 
He comes up to the pilothouse and I explain to him in a minute or 
. ' 
two what's happened here since I first picked up this vessel at twelve miles. 
We are at 1 !1:/2 miles now, The captain:then assumed command and he 
told the wheelsman to come right ninety degrees - a dramatic alteration of 
course. We did that and we missed the salt water vessel by approximately a 
half a mile as he went underneath our stem. We were still going full-
speed; we did not check. 
After he got by us I was still plotting him on .the radar and ~t that 
time whoever was in the wheelhouse ofthat boat checked his boa,t down. He 
almost came to a dead stop in the water within ten minutes after we passed 
him. I'm glad I called the skipper because the small course alterations 
weren't working- it took decisive action from the skipper. 
I learned that if this ever happens to me when I'm in charge l will 
probably take the same type of action. SometilfleS you have to deviate from 
pilot rules to get out of a ·situation. The skippers give us more latitude now. 
They tell us if you have to check it down to avoid a situation then do it. Or if 
you have to make a course change to· save the boat then do it. They tell us to 
use our discre.tion. It.didn't used to be that way. ]3ut with something 
drastic, I call the !Skipper. 
Sixth Reporter, 'Third Story 
One night, my ·second year on a li'cense, at about 12:30 in the morning 
. . . 
in the summer of 1979 I was on a 600 foot ship, up bound passing Presque 
Isle (see Figure 19). toward Poe Reef going westbound through the Straits [of 
Mackinac]. A ship came up on my port side who was downbound from Poe 
Reef. We were out far enough so he wasn~t restricted by the shoals so he 
could have obeyed the pilot rules and gone right and under my stern. 
But he wouldn~t go under my stem and he held. a course right on me. 
I was showing 'him a red light. I tried calling him about six times and he 
never answered. Finally when he was about a mile and a half from me I 
rang the old man's room because I knew he was up.· I was a pretty green 
third mate. The old man came up to the ,pilot house and I told him I tried to 
call this guy an~ he was holding a. bearing on me and I was showing him a 
red light. The C?ther vessel had plenty of room to maneuver and get out of 
my way. He wasn't answering and ·he was holding his course. The old 
man tried calling him and ·he didn't answer. 
The old man took our ship, deviated from pilot rules and went to the 
left with a lot of turn on the wheel and· we went underneath his stern. 
If one of the two parties involved is not sure what the other guy is 
doing, that's a close call. Ifhe would have gone right at the time we were 
going left, we would have been in violation. Had there been a collision, 
because of the pilot rules, we would have been at fault. These days you can 
de~ate from: pilot rules to!prevent ari accid«:mt·but you had' better be able to 
.!E . \ 
substantiate what you are doing. I think .the old man made a good move for 
the circumstances we were in. We did avoid a collision. 
It's kind of scary because you're facing a big legal problem if 
something·happens., You don't krtow :why they don't *nswer the radio, 
maybe it's off or broken. Sometimes'there:s reading material in the 
pilothouse. I've talked .to three captains about this· and none of them 
. ' 
approve of reading in the pilothouse but they don't say anything because 
they_ do~:t want to offend anyone. I've made up my mind that when I make 
skipper I'm not going to allow that up there. It:s going to be a place of 
business. I don't care if they want .to talk or read a navigation publication 
but I think it's wrong to have all this reading material up there. 
Someday there's going to be a collision or a grounding on the Great 
Lakes and they're going to attribute it to reading a Time magazine or · 
something like that. That's going to happen, there's no doubt in my mind. 
Sometimes my wheelsmen get upset with me because they see the other 
wheelsmen reading magazines or·newspapers or writing letters and I 
don't allow it on my watch. 
Sixth Reporter, Fourth Story 
lhad a situation with a sailboat on Lake Michigan in August, 1985. 
We were southbound on the lake on a 700 footer about three o'clock in the 
morning. Visibility was probably one mile to three miles; kind of a hazy 
morning. I had an uneventful watch. I was watching the radar because 
when it's foggy or hazy you start paying more attention to the radar. 
I watched the radar all morning and about three o'clock I ·saw a 
target on the radar at about two and a half miles. It was a small target, not 
very discernable. It was on my port side· about ten degrees. I got my 
00 
bearing cursor on it and it looked like it was holding a bearing. Being a 
small target I knew it wasn't a lake freighter. I thought it w:as a small 
power boat or a sailboat because it was the middle of the summer. I held 
my course remembering that a sailboat under sail always has the right-of-
way n:o matter what the circumstances. 
At about, a mile! picked up two more sailboats OD· the radar coming 
in approximately the same direction as the first one I saw. They had ilo 
night lights; they had no navigation lights - a white light or anything that I 
could see at this time. I had to make a decision to either come left or to 
come right. At a mile I had determined that they were sailboats. I wasn't 
sure if I had a who_le pack of sailboats,like ten or fifteen, or if it was just 
these three that I was seeing on the radar. I had my radar down a three 
mile range trying to find these guys and they were just barely discernable. 
I told my wheelsman to stand-by his wheel, put her on hand and he 
did that. I checked her down about ten to fifteen rpm's. I probably should 
have checked her down more as I look at it in retrospect. When we were 
one half mile from these guys I had my wheelsman come right about thirty-
five to forty degrees. The way they were heading I actually should have 
come left, but I didn't have enough time to come left without swinging my 
ship broadside to all three of these guys. I thought with their angle that I 
had a better opportunity to get out of their way by coming right. So we came 
right about thirty-five to forty 'degrees. 
When I just got her steadied up-'oil the ne:w course, steering about 220 
degrees, the sailboats had gotten closer. They were on my portside 
amidship about three hundred feet oft, heading at the mid ship part of my 
boat. I told the wheelsman to come back to the left to get my stem swinging 
to the right to clear·them- they would go underneath my stem. My only 
fJ7 
thoughtat'that time was that they had theinailboats on auto-pilot or maybe 
they had :an inexperienced look-out; 
But these people think, ''I'm a sail boat and everybody's got to ,get out 
of my way." That's their modus operandi. We cleared them and when the 
lead sailboat.was abeam of my stem, I was coming back on a slow swing to 
the left to get my stem away from him, he was seventy-five feet off and I 
saw his sails collapse because we took the wind away from him. I put a 
search light on him, too. In retrospect, I .should have blown a whistle when 
we were at a mile and a half. In that poor visibility I should have blown the 
whistle and woke them up. But at three. o'clock in the morning you're kind 
of hesitant about blowing the whistle. The. old man would call the pilot-
house asking why we're blowing the whistle out on the middle of the lake. 
I think the captain would have understood in that case so that was a little 
stupidity on my part. 
Seventh Reporter 
This reporter Is 39 years of age and has been a mariner for 18 years. 
He was licensed as a First Class Pilot in 1986. He most recently sailed as a 
2nd mate. 
Seventh Reporter,. First Story 
The near-miss situation that I recall most vividly happened in 
January of 1989 on a 700 footer. It was about 10 pm and we were going to a 
dock and planning to make one more trip yet that season. The buoys had 
been removed in the Maumee channel (see Figure 20). We were going to the 
C&O number four dock. 
•. 
The incident happened out at the place where buoys 9 and 10 in the 
Maumee River approach are usually ·placed. The regular buoys had :been 
removed for winter. We only had buoys 14 ,and 15 still in place as. markers, 
I was third mate and I was informing the captain quite regularly that we 
were outside the channel. The captain just sort of pooh~poohed me and 
said, "What the hell is this third mate trying to tell me. I'm the captain of 
the boat and he's telling me where my .boat is?" 
I put the spotlight on buoy 5 that we had already passed. At.that 
point we could feel the vibration so we knew we were very close to the 
bottom. The captain said, "Oh my God! You're right." and then he stoBped 
the engine·. The, wheelsman said; "IJm having) a hard' ti~e steering cap." 
. . 
. ' I . . . . • . . . . . . 
Instead of having five or six feet of water under us we ·had a foot. We had a 
plus. ~hirty-three inches water factor ~t that time which saved .us from 
grounding. (The next day following such a strong westerly wind we would 
have been hard aground at the same ·location)~ We were about two hundred 
yards outside the channel at the farthest point. 
We got back into the channel about where buoys 9 and 10 should have 
been after spotting buoy 14. We turned the boat around and went back out 
and anchored for the evening. 
We did have bad visibility, about a quarter of a mile because. of snow. 
The westerly wind was blowing twenty to twenty-five knots. We were going 
in without aids. Because of the reduced visibility, the ranges were coming 
in and out, we could see one but not both lights. I talked to the chieflater 
on and he said he knew something was up when the old man ordered stop 
engine so quickly after being given Maumee channel entrance. The chief 
immediately took the throttle (to the surprise of the third assistant) because 
he assumed something was up. This was the one time that I worried about 
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my license and: my career and I've been. sailing for eighteen years with five 
years on the license. I like what I do. 
The captain and I talked briefly afterwards, He said, ''I'm sorry I 
doubted your radar skills." And he mentioned being thankfulthat we had 
thirty-three inches above water datum. I spoke up to the captain and I 
would again because part of my job is for the boat to be safe and l want them 
to be aware of my observations. I trust my skills and hopefully someone else 
will trust my skills also but if they don't, let them use their skills and 
recheck mine. My job is to make sure everyone on the boat is safe, and then 
that the boat is safe and then I worry about my feelings. 
Eighth Reporter 
-, :This reporter is 59 years of age and' has. been· a ~ariner for 42 years. 
He was licensed as a Master in 1972. He most recently sailed as a master. 
. -, . . . 
Eighth Reporter,.First·Story: 
' 
- ~
It was a summer morning in 1967 and I was third mate. We were 
proceeding upbound on Lake Superior on the 292 degree course in dense, 
dense fog. Dense fog, seventy-five feet, or so. The vessel was a converted 
C-4 so in normal ballast we would make about eighteen and a half miles an 
hour. When we blow the whistle for fog we automatically dropped the 
steam to the main engines several pounds for ease of maneuverability. 
That also meant that the operating engineers could not leave the console; 
they were ready for engine orders should they be needed. 
Between Manitou Island and Keweenaw Point (see Figure 17) I 
noticed on the radar that a contact was leaving Copper Harbor. From my 
observations in the past there were only two or three things that used to 
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leave Copper Harbor: the U.S.C.G. cutter Woodrush, the passenger ferry, 
and perhaps a fish tug. I gave a security call and nobody answered~ The 
radar showed this contact still coming on ·a steady bearing, on a closing 
range. 
As we got down around eight miles I called: "the vessel outbound 
from Copper Harbor". The passenger ferry answered. I identified my 
vessel and gave our location and intentions. He had us on the radar and 
said that he was heading for Isle ROyal. Since we were the privileged ship 
he said that he would go under our stern. I gave him our speed and 
estimated time of arrival at 5 miles off Copper Harbor bearing South. 
We worked' down to six miles and I continued to watch the radar as 
the range was closing. Then it was five miles and I called him again. He 
had me on the radar. It was down to three miles and the bearing wasn't 
changing a nickel's worth. 
At two miles I called him a third time and told him we were still 
holding his bearing. I asked ifhe understood our one whistle meeting. He 
said fine, no problem. 
We continued to close and finally at one ~le I called again and told 
hiin to "stop his engines or come hard right or a combination of both or 
we're going to have a collision". Hold him that he was walking right into 
me and was at less than a mile. All ofa sudden the watchman on the bow 
yells up to me, "I can· hear a guy blowing out there." (This was the old 
·• . ·, 
three blasts in the fog signal). 
Then over .our bow on the port side just forty-eight feet off comes the 
passenger ferry. She's a passenger boat- carries about fifty people. The 
PE!Ssengers looked like baby birds in the nest, watching us pass, with their 
mouths wide open. We're in 700 to 800 feet of water, in dense fog, at about 
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forty-eight feet. I can close my eyes right. now and still see it, all these 
years later. 'Right.about then the old,man came up (the radio 
transmissions were messing up his TV reception) to ask what was going 
on. I never thought to call the old man earlier, there was nothing he would 
have done differently. 
About that time the ferry calls us and apologizes. He said: "Gosh, 
that was close." He said he got talking to one of the passengers about how 
they run things on the bridge. 
Fortunately nothing happened but the conversations were heard by 
other ships in the area. One skipper from another line called and asked 
where the ferry was .located.: He was down bound off Eagle Harbor and 
. . . . . . . . 
dicm';twant·to g~t tangled up with the same vessel. That's the closest I've 
ever,,ever_come. In that fog and. deep water there would have been a 
. ' .·. ' 
terrible loss of life. You've got to tend your net. 
~Been sailingiforty-two years; got ~ymasters license in '72 and my 
' . : :.. ,• '. 
first masters job in '79. I expect my mates to make a cut on the chart every 
half hour when in six miles of land and every hour if in twelve miles; and a 
DR [dead reckoning plot] at the start of the watch. 
Eighth Reporter, Second Story 
It was in 1968 coming downbound, two and a half miles off Whitefish 
Point, bearing 210 degrees. I picked up an intermittent contact coming 
from the vicinity of Copper Mine Point (see Figure 21) that showed a definite 
course and speed; range closing, bearing holding steady. The· fog had just 
set in. I gave a security call identifying my ship and location. Nobody 
answered. 
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Just from the time of day it was I guessed the target was the fish tug 
' ' . 
No Name. He fishes over at Brown's Fishery on Whitefish Point. We are 
loaded and making 16.5 miles an hour and that No Name might make 12 
loaded with fish. I watched him for .awhile and he'~ headed' right for 
Whitefish Point. He's closing but I've,got room to the left, I can come over 
towards Copper Mine Point; I have room to maneuver. The visibility was a 
bit better at this time - we could see about 600 feet. 
!have him plotted and we got to within about three miles. I called 
him-to see if it was the No Name. I called him by name and he came back 
on ·channel 6. He had me on the radar and was trying to get across and felt 
he could make it - I could hear that old diesel just straining right up on the 
governors. I pulled her left a little bit to let him come ahead of me. 
· That's another one where you're holding the bearings and have no 
contact with the target but I had the room to make a substantial course 
alteration if I had to and I only wo_uld have lost five minutes. We have anti-
collision systems on the radar and plotting systems on the radar. I tell my 
mates when you pick up a contact at twelve miles, plot them. At eight miles 
know what he is: small craft, freighter, etc. And at eight miles know if you 
are on a collision course so you can call him. By five miles you can both 
make your alteration for a safe crossing. Don't wait until five miles to call 
because maybe you can't gethim on the radio until three. Then before you 
take action you're at one mile. 
Eighth Reporter, Third Story 
This is the closest I've ever come to losing a ship. Two years ago 
we're coming from Detour going through Round Island Passage (see 
Figure 22) headed for Lake Michigan on an 800 foot vessel. We had a poor 
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passage coming down Lake Superior and through the river - we had1 ice and 
snow and poor visibility. I had 1been up for a long,long time; hours and 
· hours.. I had had' only cat-naps for thirty-six hours and I was beat. I ·had a 
good mate with a lot of experience, had a Masters ticket- had.been master 
of tugs, etc. It was early December so the Coast Guard had already started 
to tak~ thebuoysout.for the winter. 
~ . . 
'' . 
. !,told (the. mate) that I wasigoing to bed;'our location was outbound 
D~tour. I said he should give me a call twenty minutes from Round Island 
Passag~ and I told him to be sure and give a security call thirty minutes 
from. Round Island Passage. When they.give me a call it takes·me three to 
' ' ' ' 
four minutes to get to the pilothouse but in an emergency I can be there in 
thirty seconds; So John called and said he didn't have anything other than 
a 1000 footer ahead of us about sixteen to seventeen miles. Visibility was 
poor, snowing and blowing southwest gale force. It had been blowing 
Southwest at gale force for about' three days. 
John said he had requested the other vessel to. give us a call as soon 
as they were clear of Mackinac to let us know how the sea was. I pulled on 
my pants and grabbed a cup of coffee and went to the radars. We had two, a 
good one and an old one. I looked into the radar and asked John, "Are you 
steering on Mission Point Buoy?" He said yes, I'm steering on what should 
be the Mission Point Buoy but I'm not :sure if there~s a winter mark there or 
not and I'm not sure if there's winter markers in the Round Island 
Passage proper. 
I didn't know either so I told him to look and see if anybody had 
marked it on the chart. I .tell the mates if the Coast Guard takes the buoys 
out to mark 'WM' on the chart so we know if they have a winter marker 
there or not. 
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We are progressing and ~e hav:e to check .down going through ,there 
and we call the engineers because .ofthe .draft [shallow water causes 
considerable vessel vibration] going through Round Island passage~ John 
called for the check and I check at one, mile. 
We.can:t see the buoys yet- she~s snowing and it's a foul night. The 
other vessel called and said there:s current under that bridge that you 
would not believe -it's coming through there like crazy. He said that they 
had been under the bridge for five minutes but I thought. they were \Vrong, 
. . 
I'm watching our speed on the LORAN and I'm watching the radar and we 
can't pick up the buoys going through Round Island Passage - the two 
.. 
green buoys. Occasionally I could pick up the Mission Point buoy but I 
~ ~ . 
. couldn!t pick it up all the time. I thought it was because of sea and snow 
effect. We could see the lights of Mackinac Island and I could see Round 
Island Passage ;light.· I figured we're in good shape. 
We continued along an~ I got both search lights going, trying to see 
the buoy~. We seem to b~ 'picking them up intermittently on the small 
radar. We're getting closer, about a length from the passage proper and 
the watchman in the pilot house says, "Captain, there:s one. Right there." 
So I look down and it's just four points [45 degrees] on the port bow close 
aboard! 
And about that time the current grabbed hold of us and took the 
whole ship and was setting her to the left. An 800 foot ship making about 
twelve mph - it just picked her up sideways and pushed her to the left 
through the passage. We've got Mackinac Island to the right, Bois Blanc 
Island to the left, and all the shoals around and ahead. Your thoughts are 
on the set to the left. So I think I've got to bring. her to the right. If I'd have 
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brought her to the right :it would have brought her stem right over the shoal 
water and we would have lost her. 
I put her hard leftjust momentarily until her stern was clear and 
then put her hard right and brought her back - and then here's the part 
that blew my mind - the watchman says, "Captain there's a buoy right 
there!" 
So I called the en&iineroom and I said give me lake-gate [full power 
and speed] right no~. ·-He.answered; "It'll be a few minutes." I said, "I 
. . 
want lake•gate riglit now or we're. going ·to go aground." I watched. the rpm 
indicator and it dicfu't.mov.e .. a bit. I.put her hard left and she came left very 
'' ' I 
sluggishly, ~the current hit 'her, just g~t her stem clear of where the buoy 
should be rightroffthe old,olight. <Broughther back hard right and we're 
virtually stopped- the current's got her. We had all this way on· twelve 
miles an hour or so and I can't believe it happened. 
I can't look that engineer in the face today. I talked to him later and 
said, "I told you we must have lake-gate." He said, "Well, I had somebody 
working on one of the blowers." !thought it doesn't make any difference, 
this is the unwritten trust between the pilothouse and the engineroom. I'm 
not a throttle jockey. When I want lake•gate I want it NOW. I told him we 
were going to go aground. 
Only by the grace of God did we not go on that shoal and founder. If 
we had gone left only several hundred feet we've have lost the boat, we've 
have lost the whole crew. Below freezing, gale force winds, nobody to pick 
you up, we'd.have lost her. The thing that has come through my mind 
many times is that I had been up for so long that I almost let the mate take 
her through. If the mate had taken her through we'd have lost ·her. The 
mate~s a nice guy, but he~s not an assertive master. Had a lot of experience 
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but he was on blood pressure medication and sometimes he didn't think too 
fast. 
Another thing is that when we were getting those buoys that 
intermittent , I should have put two and two together and figured maybe it's 
'sea return, maybe it:s snow, ·maybe 'it:s current, We <couldn't see that buoy 
. . . 
be ea use ·the current was pulling it right und€r( It was like a tidal rip, . 
. that'~ how.much current t~~r~ was. I had' been up for so long - if I had had 
. -
more rest I maybe would have figured out that the current was pulling 
those bti,oys under. ,That's a)ot of current., I've never seen that before or 
since. Made up my mind then that never; ever Will I go through Round 
Island Passage again unless I am up there on the bridge. From now on, 
summer, winter, clear as a bell,. anytime, I'm going to be there. If it ever 
happens again I want to observe it. 
Ninth Reporter 
This reporter is 54 years of age and has been a mariner for 33 years. 
He was licensed as a Master in 1966. He most recently sailed as a 1st mate. 
Ninth Reporter, First Story 
We were upbound on a 500 footer one summer night, about two 
o'clock in the morning in the St. Clair River approaching Russell Island 
(see Figure 23). I was second niate. Just the wheelsman and myself were 
on the bridge and there was a watchm:an on the bow. There was a salt 
water vessel downbound. 
He didn't blow the passing signal so I blew one whistle as we 
prepared to pass port to port. He was so far over on my side of the river that 
I was afraid I was going to hit him. I felt that I had a choice of either 
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hitting him or putting it aground. Fortunately we were in ballast .so we 
were in light draft and we were able to pass. at about.six feet but he had me 
way out ofth~ channel. We were abouttwenty feet out o( the .channel. 
That was the first close~call I ever had with a vessel. My knees were 
knocking. It was in 1971. We had never established radio contact. Salt 
water vessels have American pilots in the river and he .should have known 
what he was doing. 
Ninth Reporter, Second Story 
We were out on Lake Huron. We had hauled down out ofHarbor 
Beach and we were between Harbor Beach and PortSanilac. We were ten 
miles off steering a course of 180 (south) through the Huron Cut buoys. U 
was foggy and about seven o'clock in the morning. 1 spotted a vessel 
coming upbound through the fog. 
I just took if for granted when I first spotted him that he was on the 
northbound course .353 degrees on the inside of us. As he kept getting closer 
the beari~g wasn't changing so I notified the captain who was in the 
pilothouse for coffee and his first look of the morning. 
We we~e now only three miles away. We tned c!llling him and he 
wouldn't ans~er. The captain took the window the~ atid: by the time we 
backed down and: stopped we cleared1him by only sixty feet. We could see 
him in the dense fog. We had both been blowing our fog signal. This was in 
1980. 
I was on a maritime vessel about 620 feet long and 60 feet beam. The 
other vessel was a Canadian boat heading for the Canadian shore. 
Tenth Reporter 
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This· reporter is 58 years of age and has been a mariner for 35 years. 
He.wasrlicensed as a Master in 1974. He most recently sailed as a master. 
Tenth reporter, First story 
The one that scared me the most happened downbound from Lake 
Superior to the locks. This situation occurred in the fall, September or 
bc~ber ,ci~ri~g dayli~ht hours. we had the normal.complement of myself, 
. . \. 
a. watch officer ~d a wheelsman in the pilothouse and a watchman on the 
bow. 
I was approaching Point Louise (see ~igure 9) on the green side of the 
( • .~ ..1 
chann~l. my sid~ of the channeL There was an up-bound tanker being 
sailed by a 8anadian on a B license. There was a sand barge also 
downbound that had been doing some work just above Point Louise and was 
heading for the dock near the locks. The sand barge and crane was 
down bound at the same time I was. ·He of course only drew about six feet of 
water so he could stay well outside the channel with perfect safety. 
As I came around the first left turn, swinging wide, the upbound 
tanker wasr on my side of the chann~l and moving slowly straight at me. I 
had assumed that all traffic would ·be in the proper ·location and that this 
would be a one whistle pass. 1 had to call him and. tell him to get it over 
because he was moving so slowly and so hesitantly. He seemed reluctant to 
give it a kick to get it over to the correct side of the channel. 
Apparently what had happened, the sand barge and he had been 
talking on another channel and I didnit realize it. The sand barge had 
asked for a two whistle passing and the tanker had agreed to that. The 
tanker did not realize that the sand barge was the first of two vessels 
downbound and assumed that I had asked for a two whistle passing so he 
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was well over to the left in the channel.to accommodate• me. We moved as 
far right as we could in the channel and checked it down so that the tanker 
could complete his turn. 
At the second turn there js a rock pile and a buoy right where I first 
saw him. The tanker and I missed by some thirty feet or less from my bow 
to his stern. 
It-seemed to me that .the non-standard passing of the sand barge was 
critical in this case as was the use of non-standard radio channels for the 
communication pattern. Had they been on the correct channel I probably 
would have heard and realized what was going on and gotten involved into 
the situation. 
Tenth Reporter, Second Story 
The. second situation occurred when I was approaching the Blue 
Water Bridge '(see Figure 11). The passage underneath the bridge is one 
vessel, one-way traffic.so we need to coordinate with other traffic who is to 
proceed first. In pilotage rules the downbound vessel is the privileged 
vessel and the upbound vessel is required to give way. This situation 
occurred in daytime in summer with a north, northeast wind blowing 
around twenty-eight to thirty knots. I was downbound in a 640 foot vessel 
approaching the Blue Water Passage. 
An upbound vessel called and said that he was at the Black River and 
would be. making the Blue Water Passage in about eighteen to twenty 
minutes. I agreed to allow him to come through first since he was closer to 
the bridge than l was. As time passed and it got to be almost twenty 
minutes, we could see the bridge but could see no vessel, neither visually or 
on radar. So I checked down some. 
HO 
I couldn!t check down a. whole lot becaus.e of the north, northeast 
Wind which would set me outside the channel and also was driving me 
down toward the .bridge. There's not enough room for me to inake a 360 
degree turn and stay inside the channel, particularly with that Wind 
condition. Eventually he came through the bridge thirty-eight minutes 
after the call. At the time he came through the bridge I was already past 
the two buoys and we met.on the right hand turn just prior to the bridge. 
I was ·not able to slow it down anymore. I was in a position of having 
to proceed forward. He made the tUrn. keeping to the middle of the channel, 
his normal turn, as if I wasn'.t there and that put me hard on the right side 
of the channel. The Coast Guard called me to remind thafs a one-way 
passage. I told them that the other vessel had informed me that he was at 
Black River and eighteen minutes out and did not come out for thirty-eight 
minutes and I had given him as much time and space as I could possibly 
do without putting my vessel in jeopardy also. There were no formal written 
documents although I know the Coast Guard did inform the other vessel of 
his error. 
Tenth Reporter, Third Story 
The third and'final story concerns my uery first watch as a third 
mate. I was downbound in the St~ Clair River many years ago, on the 
. . ' 
morrung watch: Our company had a retired captain who owned a home 
along the river near Marine City (see Figure 8) and: so my captain took me 
onto the wing .to wave to that old retired captain. I don't know why, but 
from the wing I suddenly moved to the front window and discovered two 
men swimming in the middle of the St. Clair River and we were bearing 
down hard on them. 
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1 called to the wheelsman, "Hard"left" to swing the bow away from 
them just as a power boat put out from shore to pick them up. When I 
looked up there was an up bound vessel coming right toward me. The first 
swimmer was picked up in a 'Zodiac lift~ .• the second swimmer was closer 
to me so I swung hard right in order to swing the stern away from him and 
to begin to prepare for a one whistle passage. The power boat picked up the 
second swimmer and I steadied her up very far to the right to allow a one 
whistle passage with the upbound vessel. 
An hour or so later as we came through the new cut-off [St. Clair 
CutoflJ (see Figure "6) and an upbo\lnd' vessel was crossing on a constant 
·' . \ ' 
bearing. We were showing red and downbound. He was showing green 
· and upbound but he_ did not make _the _haul for the ne:w cut-off channel and 
seemed to be going toward the old channel. I finally was able to raise him 
on the radio· and he made a hard righi. We passed within six feet of each 
other at the end of.the cut-off between Lake St. Clair and the St. Clair River. 
We were delivering a load of moulding sand to the Windsor side of the 
Detroit River that day and during unloading operations I' was again on 
watch. Toward the end of my evening watch (8:00P.M. to midnight) the 
unloading crew included one sailor who had been uptown drinking a little 
too long. The captain asked him if he was able to work and he said, "Yes 
sir,just let me change my clothes." Moulding sand is very, very fine 
powdery sand. It has a fine, dust-like consistency. The sailor changed his 
clothes and came forward to where the hatch was open and the sand was 
being pulled onto the belt for unloading. For reasons unknown he 
proceeded to jump into the hold and instantly he was in sand up to his neck. 
I signaled for the conveyorman to stop the machines. You have to 
imagine the sand going down in a conical shape, down through the gate, to 
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the belt, ·and then- out. He was now vertical in this sand' with just his head 
showing. He.hollered out that he could not breathe and I realized that the 
sand around him was pressing on him and was keeping him from 
breathing. ·I told one of the deck hands to reach down and tie a t-shirt over 
his head to keep the sand out of his mouth and nose. 
11 could think of only one way to ~get him out.of there. If we had waited 
until we could open gates and clear the sand slowly and safely he would 
have suffocated before we could get half the sand away from him. We could 
not have dug it out because of the weight of men standing on it would have 
suffocated him. 
So I told! the conveyorman to turn on the ·conveyor and run it as fast 
as he could. The sailor with the t"shirt around his head disappeared down 
through the pile of sand because he was heavier than the sand and after a 
moment I signaled a stop and he was dovm and through the four foot 
clearance on the belt, covered with sand~ but otherwise unhurt. 
That sailor and I played poker many times over the years together 
and everyday we. sailed together he thanked me for saving his life. 
When I got home I was not sure sailing on a license was a good idea, 
I had almost run over two swilnmers, had two near collisions, and almost 
lost a sailor in the course· of my first watch. 
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CHAPTER5 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis 
'!'his study is ,ail exploration -of whafand why in the near miss 
- . 
experience. 'The essential question is: in what ways and to what degree did 
the. typical or tr~dit_ional maritime orga~zation structure shift or change 
) . 
in a given situation such that a potential accident was turned into a near 
miss. ' ' 
The propositions are: one or more of the following events occurred 
which took the situation out of the normal structure~ 
l) The captain or another watch officer opened the door for an 
alternative structure. That is, the captain or senior watch officer present 
turned to another member of the :bridge-watch and said words to the effect: 
"What do you think is happening, what should we do". 
2) Someone else on the bridge-watch stepped forward and stepped out 
of role required by the vertical or horizontal differentiation and drew the 
attention of the watch officer or captain to the situation. 
3) The fear of the potential accident overcame the fear of the master's 
reprisal (see Hershey 1988) and someone stepped out of the typical 
structure. 
4') A peer relationship between captains or watch officers was the 
foundation for the change. 
5) A prior relationship existed between one or more members of the 
bridge-watch and that prior relationship was the foundation for change. 
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Yin (1989, 105) in discussing the analysis of case eVidence says, 
"Analysis is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing 
case studi·es." He continues, "Unlike statistical analysis, there are few 
fixed formulas or cookbook recipes .to guide the novice. Instead, much 
depends on an investigator's own style of rigorous thinking; along with the 
sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative 
interpretation .. " 
He says (106): "The first and more preferred strategy is to follow the 
theoretical propositions that led to the case study. The original objects and 
design of the case study presumably were based on such propositions, 
which in turn. reflected a set of research questions, reviews of the literature, 
and new insights." 
The table (Figure 24) on the next page matches each of the reporters 
and their stories against the five propositions. The data are. portrayed as: 
first reporter stories one through four 
second reporter stories one through five 
third reporter stories one and two 
. fourth reporter stories one and two 
fifth reporter story·one 
sixth reporter stories one through four 
seventh reporter story one 
eighth reporter stories one through three 
ninth reporter stories one and .two 
tenth reporter stories one through three 
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The propositions are arranged in columns. 
' 
Proposition 1, that the captain or another watch officer 
changed the structure .. 
Proposition 2, someone else on the bridge watch stepped 
forward. 
Proposition 3, fear overcame role restrictions. 
Proposition 4, ,peer relationships on the bridge watch 
allowed an interaction. 
Proposition 5, a prior relationship between members of the 
bridge watch permitted this shift.· 
Column 6 records the stories which do not include an organization 
shift. Column 7 is a new finding which will be described briefly below. 
Of the twenty-seven stories, five (18.5%) match propositions one, two 
or three. Those stories are: 
first reporter third story 
second reporter third story 
fourth reporter second story 
fifth reporter first story 
seventh reporter first story 
The first.reporter in his third story, discussed the lack of radio 
coordination for vessels passing the southeast shoal light, the hub of traffic 
on Lake Erie. He says, "We got within about six miles ..•...... and I broke 
the code of silence." He.goes on to say that the captain, once called to the 
pilothouse, also broke the code of silence and attempted to reach the target 
by radio. Proposition three states .that a degree of concern caused this 
reporter to break the code initially and for the captain to also break the code. 
Figure 24 Pattern Analysis·ofthe Propositions 
PrQllQI!itiQD!i; 1 g a· ·~ 5· 2 7 
First Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Story 2 X 
Story3 X 
Story4 X 
Second Reporter 
Story 1 x 
Story 2 X 
Story3 - . X 
Story.4 X 
Story 5 X 
Third Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Story 2 X 
Fourth Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Story 2 X 
Fifth Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Sixth Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Story2 X 
Story3 X 
Story4 X 
Seventh Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Eighth Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Story2 X 
Story 3 X 
Ninth Reporter 
Story1 X 
Story2 X 
Tenth Reporter 
Story 1 X 
Story2 X 
Story 3 X 
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The reporter,goes on "We got less than a milefromhim and the captain 
. I . , . . . . . . 
was in the radar and I w:as inthe window with the binoculars. I saw his 
anchor lights and saw no running lights. I blurted1·out W's a vessel!"' 
The story as ·presented by the· reporter,, the words selected and the 
emphasis of the voice. indicated to .the researcher that this was an unusual 
' . ' . 
statement, unusually loudly spoken· and declaratory rather than 
observational in nature. 
The third story of the second reporter and the first story of the fifth 
reporter demonstrate that someone else on the bridge watch stepped 
forward, out of their role, and took a stronger position than one would 
normally expect in order to create the near miss. 
In his third story the second reporter is describing a situation at the 
Blue Water Bridge on a 1000 footer. The conn of the vessel was up to the 
second mate; the captain was on the bridge, but·did not have the conn. The 
second m.ate delayed in his turn; waited too long for the turn and the 
captain stepped forward, out of his role of observer [a somewhat unusual 
role], took the conn and began the turn. It is the right of the captain to do 
this, butit would be a significant event for him t9 step forward with a 
seasoned second mate such as was described in the story. 
The first story of the fifth reporter is another illustration of someone 
else stepping forward out of their role. The mate was providing 
information .to the master who had the corm as to the position of the vessel 
and the time to begin the haul. The mate said, initially, that the vessel was 
lined up for the turn. The captain made no movement. The mate indicated 
then, "You're past the red line-up." The captain, for the second time, failed 
to start the haul. The mate then said, "The middle of the channel is in 
line." The captain failed to respond. Finally the mate for the fourth time, 
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and nQw rather forcefully s;rid', "Y.~u. are past the middle of the channel." 
~ ;; . 
After the fourth statement, the captain finally started the turn. 
The delay of the turn was noted ,by the on,coming vessel and a 
conversation took place between the two at that time. The first mate in this 
case attempted to stay in the role as prescribed, to· provide information and 
to support the eyes of the master with the corm. 
At the fourth juncture, according to the reporter, the sense of 
urgency and the strength of the comment was a much greater indication to 
the captain: "You must do something. I have stepped out of my role as 
mate and are requesting that you make a move, NOW!" 
In the case of the seventh reporter, first story; the situation.was 
overcome when the third mate was.able to, "put the spotlight.on the buoy 
that we had already passed." At that'the point the captain said, "Oh my 
god, you're right." And then he stopped the engines and eventually moved 
the vessel out of the channel. The third mate informed the captain several 
times that it was in a position of danger. This third mate kept pushing 
information at the captain, who has the conil, until the evidence of a 
mistake is overwhelming. This is in contrast to the previous situation 
involving a first mate continuing to step forward to the captain. 
The final story which indicates a .conformance with the propositions 
is the second story of the fourth reporter in a situation with a tug and barge 
in a December southwest gale in which the tug lost its steering and also 
had a flooded after-compartment; The captain, as he relates this story, 
relies heavily upon much support and many ideas from his chief engineer 
and his first mate. Although the decisions are clearly the captain's, the 
organization is very blurred in terms of horizontal or vertical 
differentiation. This captain, in describing his vessel, suggests that part of 
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the difficulty in the typical vertical structure is that it reduces the sharing 
of observations and experiences and thus reduces the education and 
learning for others. 
Five of the twenty-seven stories indicate that a near miss included 
some degree of change in the traditional vertical and horizontal 
differentiation; the .structure of the maritime organization. None of the 
stories reported indicated that a peer relationship or a prior relationship 
was the basis for the shift in the·organization. It had been hypothesized 
that two equal officers would rely upon each .other. That issue is addressed 
by the first reporter in· his parenthetic expressions about the third story 
when he said, "Even today after I've sailed as captain, another captain will 
ne~er ask what i think.·.· Once last year :I was first· mate and a captain asked 
' ·!. • ; - J. ·_ •· .- r: 
· whatTthought aboU:ta non-critical situation. My reacti'on was, 'Why ask 
me, you're, ~he captain': Of course, he'. had b.trmped me from the captain's 
' job on that vessel." 
. : ·: · . : The same ~xpectation appliedto the ~o~ntial for prior relationships, 
people who have sailed together in the past. The second reporter, third 
story, in describing such a situation with a second mate with whom he had 
sailed for a number of years, . demonstrated that a prior relationship did not 
impact the action. 
In these twenty-seven stories are five which seem to suggest another 
proposition. These stories are: 
first reporter, fourth story 
third reporter, first story 
third reporter, second story 
eighth reporter, first story 
eighth reporter, second story 
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'. • 
It is the responsibility of a watch officer of.the bridge watch to 
. maintain control of ~s own vessel. · In overtaking, passing, or crossing 
situations it is common for multiple vessels to communicate by radio and to 
coordinate the means for their safe ttarisit. Vessels, bridge watch to bridge 
watch, will agree on a one-whistle passing,. or a change in speed or 
direction to accommodate faster or slower vessels, or an early decision to 
change heading or speed to accommodate a crossing situation. It is 
unusual for vess.els to he directed in their performance by a bridge watch of 
another vessel. Yet five of the twenty-seven stories tell of situations in 
which one bridge watch took control of the entire situation, including the 
other·vessels involved. 
The fourth story of the first reporter describes a situation in the St. 
Clair River in which his vessel was overtaking another vessel and a third 
vessel appeared down bound which neither of the up bound vessels was 
expectit;tg. Normally a passing situation such as this would be met on the 
one-whistle; or port-to-port side. But the downbound vessel, as the 
privileged vessel, had the choice of whether to rneet port-to-port on one 
whistle or to go between the two upbound vessels. The conning officer of the 
downbound vessel, "When he saw the two of us coming, he blurted out, 'I'll 
split between you'. It was instantaneous on his part, he probably had a 
heart attack when he saw us. But at the moment he decided to split 
between us we were too close together, he would not have fit." 
In essence, the downbound vessel took control of the whole situation, 
required the overtaking vessel to move as far to the left as possible, and 
required the overtaken vessel to move as far to the right as possible allowing 
three vessels to fill the entire channel. There was less than one hundred 
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feet between the vessels and' both of the outside vessels were within approx-
iinately fifty feet.of the shoreline. 
The third reporter described two situations in which a similar 
organization was created. The first, downbound to Sa:rnia at the Blue 
Water Bridge in summer fog in which an upbound vessel suddenly 
appeared steering toward the right of the reportet~s vessel. The captain of 
the reporter's vessel took control ofthe situation and without diseussion, or 
commentary, or opportUnity for disagreement commanded over the radio: 
"Hard right, hard right, hard right." The other vessel apparently complied 
with that demand because moments later the reporter's captain 
commanded, "Hard left." He had clearly taken control of the entire 
situation and managed the passing of the two vessels as if they were one 
organized entity. 
The first story of the.eighth reporter indicates that it is not only 
captains who can take such control. At the time ofthe incident the 
reporter was a third mate. He says, 'We continued to close and finally at 
one mile I called again and told him to stop his engines or come hard right 
or some combination ofboth or we were going to have a collision. I told him 
that he was walking right into me and was less than a .mile away." This 
commercial vessel and passenger ferry .passed less than fifty feet apart. 
The third mate reached out and with no discussion, nor compromise, nor 
agreement took COJ).tro) of both the oncoming vessel and his OVln vessel and 
' 
nianaged it as a sirigle organization. 
In hi_s se.cond story the eighth reporter describes a crossing situation 
in which he was the privileged vessel. A smaller vessel was attempting to 
doss in fti:mt'l:>f him ~thout givmgway as i_t should have. Other than a 
series of discussions and commentary about the capacity of the second 
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vessel, this reporter turned his vessel in. such a way as to allow the 
burdened vess~l to have the right of way. The near miss here was not so 
much in tenns ofdistance but rather that the reporter controlled the entire 
two-vessel situation outside of the rules of pilotage. 
Conclusion 
Of.this sample of twenty-seven near miss instances, 18.5% ofthe 
reporters describe a form of organization change as predicted by the initial 
propositions, In one instance the captain opened the door for alternative 
actions and suggestions to be put forward. In three situations another 
-m~in.b~r of the bri.dge ,watch, but ·.not the. conning officer, stepped forward. 
In one case it was the captain and the third mate who both stepped forward 
'I • j 
tobreakthe code of silence. 
The r~porters do not say, th,at it was these acts which prevented an 
ac~ide~t. although all ofthe·m' reply tha; th~se were critical .actions and 
moments in the near miss experience. No reporters specifically described 
peer or prior relationships as the foundation for an organization change, 
although several of the reporters discussed these issues, ex-recorder, or ih 
parenthetic commentary. Peer or prior relationships appear not to be 
germane. 
Five ofthe cases described an unpredicted change in the organization 
structure. The customary structure in a two or more vessel situation is for 
each vessel to maintain independent control within the pilotage rules. It is 
nearly unheard of for a master to even attempt to control or give direction to 
another vessel. Coordination through a process of discussion and 
communication may establish non-standard procedures under certain 
circumstances. This process however, is almost always a two-way flow and 
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grants equal status to the bridge watch of a}}: vessels involved. In five 
stories as described in this case study (first reporter, first story; third 
reporter,first and second; stories; and eighth reporter; first and second 
stories), one master, or watch officer took control of the entire multiple 
,, 
vessel orgariization and directed. the movements •onhe other vessel, or 
I, ' ' , , r 
vessels, as well as his o\vn. 
'' Ym (53-54) states: 
(t)hus., the ,ability,to .conduct six o:r" ten case studies, arranged 
effectively Within: a multiple"Case .design, is analogous to the ability to 
conduct six to ten experiments or related .topics; a few cases (two or 
three) would 'be literal replications, whereas a few other cases (four to 
six) might be designed to pursue two different patterns of theoretical 
replications~ If all the cases turn out as predicted, these six to ten 
cases, in the aggregate, would have provided compelling support for 
the initial set of propositions. IT the cases are in some way 
contradictory, the initial propositions must be revised and retested 
with another set of cases. Again, this logic is similar to the way 
scientists deal with contradictory experimental findings, 
In some ofthe cases, a change from the tra4itional maritime 
structure occurred but in most of the cases the traditional structure 
remained intact. Peer or prior relationships probably do not influence a 
change in the organization structure. In soine of the cases the conning 
officer of one vessel took control of the entire situation and, through 
communication and coordination, managed· the situation to a successful 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER6 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has been ail exploratory or preliminary research into the 
how and why of the maritime near miss experience. It is framed from the 
perspective ofthe field of organization theory and· organization behavior 
rather than from the technical perspective of maritime shiphandling. Its 
.purpose was to determine the degree to which certain propositions having 
to do with changes iri the organization occurred in near miss situations on 
the United States Great Lakes waters. Twenty~seven stories of near miss 
have been recorded and documented. These stories can form the founda-
tion for an on-going review of near-miss experiences. 
The research should be continued on the United States Great Lakes 
and should be extended to United States deep sea vessels, rivers, and pilot 
associations to develop a near-miss repository of experiences and successes. 
This could folow the same structure as recommended by the Det norske 
Veritas study of 1978-81, and the United States Department of Transpor-
tation study 1984-86~ ·· ~uch an extension of the study would require the 
' ' 
development of a tape library and key phrase data-base developed for 
computet: 'sorting and 'matchlng. 
The unexpected proposition referring to a master or bridge-watch 
taking control of an entire situation without conversation or discussion 
between vessels should be pursued with some vigor. If such an organi-
zation is occurring at a high enough frequency, it should be included in 
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' ,, 
the training and preparation of masters and mates so .that they are better 
abie to manage the entire situation. 
A one-person bridge-watch is of much interest in Europe (Beetham 
and Habberly 1989, Benford 1988, Cross 1990) under a variety of names. 
There are some suggestions of technology depende~ce in the situations 
described by the reporters in this study. Several ofthem make it clear that 
radar is.notat its bestwhen conditions·are at their worst. It may be that the 
one-person technology is not sufficiently advanced .to make the one-person 
bridge safe at least in some of the situations reported, a second - and 
sometimes a third or fourth - person in the bridge-watch was required for 
safe passage. 
In order to test single-person control, these near-miss situations 
could be replicated using the computer generated imagery and ship-
. handling capability of one or more of the world's maritime simulators. 
Individuals could be tested on their ability to manage complexity in a single 
person bridge-watch using the scenarios described by the reporters in this 
study. Such simulation-based experimentation could include the impact of 
fatigue and/or .boredom upon the capacity of professional mariners· to safely 
operate with a single person bridge-watch. 
Furthermore, those simulators should be used to assess the degree 
·to which these stories represent normal or abnormal actions by typical 
bridge-watch configurations. That is, an experimental design should be 
established, using a selection of these cases, with sufficient subjects 
(perhaps ten), to test the degree to which others would react in similar 
kinds of ways. 
Such a study might produce four outcomes. First, how to organize 
the structure, process, communication and coordination in the bridge-
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watch so as to encourage actions within that bridge-watch to cause near-
misses rather than accidents. The cases in this research represent 
glimpses into the real world. A series of simulator based studies of a 
controlled experimental nature might offer clues to alternative 
organization structures to· prevent accidents. 
The second outcome of such simulator experimentation could 
answer the question: boY/ sho.uld t~e role of captain be structured ·and 
played out in such a new organization. A military airlift command report 
(Orlady and Foushee 1987,.149) suggested thatthe role of captain be 
changed to information manager rather than aircraft commander. In 
such circumstances the captain becomes responsible for evaluating the 
whole situation and a watch officer (co-pilot in the aircraft) would give 
steering/speed directions to others on the bridge-watch, A controlled 
experiment to establish the viability of such a procedure in the maritime 
industry should be tested. 
The· appropriate experimental design might also produce data 
concerning high error rate bridge-watch patterns. It may be that certain 
organizational structures and practices could be identified as leading to 
greater numbers of near-misses or higher numbers of technical and 
performance errors. Simulator studies with appropriate experimental 
designs could answer such questions formulated from the study at hand. 
The study has shown that sometimes there is an organizational shift in the 
unfolding of a near-miss experience. It could be hypothesized for future 
research that the organization shift could be established as a norm rather 
that an unusual organization and that master mariners could be trained to 
operate under such an arrangement. 
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Finally, such :experiment!ltion could, explore the unanticipated 
finding of this research: the process of taking control of the entire situation, 
. . . ' I 
including, other vessels, by one of the bridg~-watchs. The ,simulation 
experimentation could establish patterns of communication, coordination 
and organization in multiple-vessel situations to become the foundation for 
future training of mariners and established rules for safe watch-' keeping or 
navigation. 
A recurring theme in many of these near-miss experiences is the 
lack of communication between members of the bridge-watch, especially 
between the captain and others. There continues to be a reluctance to 
disagree with the captain or to offer alternative suggestions. This cultural 
situation should be ·of continuing concern, especially to the shipowners and 
the academies, as they describe and define the reqUirements for bridge 
watch-standers. 
Lastly, the organization changes noted in those situations where a 
shift occurred (37%) should be made part of the professional mariner's 
repertoire. That is, mariners should be trained' to recognize the point at 
which the boundary from one organization form (the normal) has been 
reached and the new (the shift) is being entered. This training should 
include situation awareness skills to prepare masters and watch-standers 
to recognize the need to shift the organization and opportunities to 
experiment with the changed form. Further, mariners should be 
encouraged to regularly practice the alternative fonn much as they already 
regularly practice other emergency tasks including man overboard drills. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH REPORTERS 
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May3, 1990 
Dear Captain/First Class Pilot: 
As a professional mariner, you may have experienced a close call (or 
a near miss) sometime during your career. These are the situations where 
a potential accidEmt<collision, grounding, fire, etc) is prevented within .a 
time frame which made it !'almost too late':. These are the never-to-be-
forgotten incidents which we often keep to ourselves but which guide our 
careers. 
lloward Douwsma (whom you may kn.ow as Dow) is a Ph. D. 
candidate at 'l'he Union Institute.· His doctorai• thesis will be on these near 
. . miss situations and he has asked for our 'nelp. ·First; we ask that .each of 
you complete tlie annonymous question'naire enclosed (Part A) and return 
it to him~ Second, be has requested that you be given the opportunity to 
provide him With details about close calls you may have had or 'observed, in 
a confidential personal conversation. (Your name will remain confidential 
and will not be included on any summary report.) These conversations will 
be held at a mutually convenient,time:during June, July, August, and 
September 1990. Ifyou wotild'be willingto talk with him please complete 
Part B of the questionnaire so that the conversation time may be arranged. 
Your Joint Training Advisory Committee believes that this study is 
important. While all details will be held' in strict confidence- as required by 
The Union Institute, the summary restilts will be made available to all who 
participate in the study and to all future students atthe Training•Center. 
These close calls are a powerful way to learn how to practice professional 
shiphandling and navigation. We encourage your participation. 
Sincerely, 
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i •· 
Part A 
Close Call Study 
·Questionn~ire 1996 
":'· ' I' ' 
1. How many years. have you been sailing? ____ _ 
How old are you?_~:-:------=--
What is your current license?_~-----------:-'----
2. Buring your career, about how many· close calls or near Illisses have 
you observed? · 
1-2 3-5 &:10 11~15 more 
3. Which ofthese factors contribute to the close calls you ·have observed 
(check as many as apply): 
__ Time of day 
--~Weather conditions 
___ Ice 
____ Overtaking 
___ .Passing 
___ Carelessness 
--~·Fatigue 
___ Operator error 
--~Mechanical failure 
--~!Electrical failure 
___ ._Electronic failure 
Inattention 
--Calculated risk 
___ .Lack of experience 
___ .Lack of training 
___ '.Failure to follow rules 
4. In your judgement which ofthese conditions are the most critical? 
1. 
2. 
3; 
5. Have you ever been personally" involved in a close call or near Illiss? 
__ .No Yes 
6. Have you told others about your personal .experience? 
___ No one Professional mariners only 
__ A few people Lots of people 
7. Would you be willing to tell about close calls in a confidential 
conversation with Dow? 
__ No Thank you for completing this 
questionnaire. Please mail it in the 
attached envelope to: 
Doward G. Douwsma 
531 Belmonte Park N #1005 
Dayton, OH 45405. 
__ yes Thank you. Please complete Part B of the 
questionnaire and' mail' both Parts A and B 
in the attached envelope to Dow. 
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PartB 
Name: (Print)'--------------'"-----
Vessel=------------------..,..----
Poffition: ____________________ __ 
Anticipated vacation dates:. _____________ _ 
Which of these ports do you regularly make: __ .... Cleveland 
-~Lorain 
__ T_oledo 
--:Bums Harbor 
--:IDuluth 
__ Ro.gers City (Calcite) 
__ Others ~please list) 
Home address and ,phone: ________________ _ 
Dow will be making arrangements to meet with you during 
June- September 1990 
August 3, 1990 
Dear 
(j: 
· Thank you ;for agreeing to help with niy research .into· "near misses". 
The response of professional milriners such as you is truly gratifying. 
·You will recall that w:e had orginally planned to get together during 
the swnmer. sailing season - June to September, Unfortunately my brother-
in-law died in June and we are still workingon getting Mom into a 
satisfactory retirement facility in.Wisconsin' (she had been living with him 
in San lliego).- It is unlikely·that I 'wilHe able· to meet with you this season. 
Therefore, I would like to schedule our visit during February at a site 
near your home .. It's too early to be specific but I am planning a trip 
through Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin to meet with all of you. 
We can set the actual schedule in January- after the close of the season. In 
doing .the rough planning it would be helpful for me to know if you would be 
available in February (or do you Motor Home away toFlorida?)and if there 
are any times you know now that you will ·be unavailable. If we can~t 
schedule a mutual visit I would' like to suggest a telephone conversation. 
Would you please use the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope to let 
me know. 
Thank you for your continued interest. 
Sincerely, 
Bow 
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Dow: 
!will will not be available during February. 
I expect to be at home from _____ _ to 
in February. 
I would be willing·to talk by telephone (no·cost to me)ifwe can't 
schedule another way to do it. Yes __ _ 
Name 
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Mr. JamesS · 
1207 105th Avenue W. 
Duluth, MN 55808 
Dear Mr, S: 
53•1 Belmonte Park North 
Dayton, OH 45405 
February 4, 1991 
Thank you for being wiiling to share your "near-miss" experiences 
with me. Our conversation should take about an hour. 
We agreed to meet at on at __ . I will 
be driving some distance so weather might become a problem. If I get 
delayed, l will call you. You can reach my answering macliine (which I 
check every day) at 513"445c0530. 
Looking forward to our meeting. 
Sincerely, 
Boward G. 'Bouwsma 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE PROTOCOL 
. 154. 
APPENDIX2 
THEPR0110COL 
[The pro~col ~as established to assure consistent data gathering. 
The protocol was reviewed in brief with each reporter. ·Emphasis was 
placed on the purposes of the study, the methods of ensuring confiden-
tiality, and the non-judgemental nature of the research.] 
This case study research is undertaken to further our knowledge of 
the organization structure and process that may occur in a near-miss 
situation. The data will be developed through a series of interviews with 
master mariners and first class pilots sailing the Great Lakes. The 
researcher is an interested observer but is not.a qualified mariner. The 
goal is to identify possible shifts in the organization or in ways of 
performing the bridge-watch function which can be translated from the 
data into learning tools for master mariners. If in fact the data supports 
the. propositions, then it should be possible to train people in new skills. in 
order to cause near-misses rather than accidents. 
The tasks of the study are to identify and capture the detail of near-
miss stories in such a way that the organization structure and process 
might be clearly articulated following the interviews. Based upon the 
results of the data we hope to develop training programs which will allow 
master mariners to use the knowledge gained in shared near-miss 
experiences. 
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This research is undertaken under the auspices of the Graduate 
School of The Union Institute as part of a Doctoral Program; I>oward G, 
Douwsma, Candidate, Barry Heermann, Core Faculty. Issues involved 
include organization, bridge-watch organization, bridge management, 
human error, and the near-miss .phenomena as described primarily in the 
maritime industry. 
The program of research is supported .by the Safety and Education 
Plan of the District 2 Marine Engineers Benevolent Association-Associated 
Maritime Officers (AFL-CIO). The reporters are all members of this 
association and have volunteered after being contacted through the 
association. 
All masters and first class pilots who sail the Great Lakes and are 
members of the Association were invited to participate in this study. A 
letter (appendix 1) was sent by name to each of those officers (approximately 
250 individuals) in April!May 1990, briefly describing the study and asking 
them to participate. The material was mailed by the MEBA-AMO Safety 
and Education Plan. Seventeen officers responded in the affirmative (and 
nine in the negative) with the expectation that the interviews would be 
conducted during the summer of 1990. Because of personal problems and 
organizational logistics those interviews were not conducted at that time 
and were postponed until February, 1991. In August, 1990 a letter to that 
effect was sent to all who responded with a request that they·reply again in 
the affirmative· if they would be available in Februar.y 199L Of those, twelve 
responded· again in the affirmative. Two individuals were not available, 
one in Florida and the other in Arizona during the interview process. 
1.56 
Field Procedures 
A. 'The principal interviewer is Doward G. Douwsma who. is a former 
naval officer and· who has been responsible for management training of 
Great Lakes mariners for over fifteen years. He is a candidate for the Ph.D. 
degree. 
B. All interviews will 'he audio taped provided the subject concurs. 
Those tapes will be coded by random number and will ·not be identified as to 
subject name or city of interview. Access to those tapes will<be limited to the 
researcher, the researcher~s associate and members of the doctoral 
committee. The names of the subjects Will not be released to anyone. 
Anonymity beyond the researcher. is guaranteed' and confidentiality of data 
is also assured. 
C. Of particular concern in this research is the issue of subject 
confidentiality and ethics. All subjects have volunteered to tell their stories. 
All subjects will be given the opportunity to review the general miture ofthe 
researcher's notes oftheir experience prior to completion of the research 
and its publication. All subje'cts have 'been promised a copy of all of the 
stories following acceptance of the work. 
D. All interviews took place at a location acceptable to the reporter. 
This included their homes, public restaurants, .and motel receptiOJ?. areas. 
The reporter, the researcher, and on occasion the researcher~s associate 
were the only people within hearing distance. 
E .. The experiences of the reporters were transcribed from the audio 
tapes. The.only editing was to assure clarity, especially for readers with a 
• non-maritime ·background. 
' I 
157 
F. The demographic data, recorded· at the time ofthe irit,erview, has 
not.been included so as to protect the anonymity ofthe reporters ~the 
community of licensed mariners on the Great Lakes is quite smalla. 
G. The interviews took as little as one hour and as much as two and 
a hruf hours. Each reporter was given an unliinited time frame and the 
freedom to describe his experiences at his own pace. 
H. The researcher raised questions .to enhance cl~rity, 
~ ," . ~ ' 'I ' - ' ~ I ' ' I 
· .comple~riess, and to get the .reporters to articulate their thoughts and 
feelings. Care was taken to prevent the use ofleading or influencing 
questions: 
L. Notes· and ,tapes from the interviews are maintained in the office of 
• ' . • •• • ' • . I ; ' ' 
the researcher. Those notes and tapes are coded and the actual names of 
the reporters are maintained in a separate, not contiguous file. 
Interview Format 
l. Introduction and Purposes 
-the Master 
- Dow 
-purposes 
- Ph. D. degree 
- Master's expertise 
- knowledge and skill 
- teaching others 
- use of tape recorder (My preference is to use the voice activated, 
i:niniature machine but the choice will be uneqUivocally up to the 
Master). 
2. Demographics of the Master 
-age 
- experience 
-Master since when 
- years of other experience 
-other 
3. The Environment at the Time of'the Close Call 
-location 
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- physical conditions 
- time of year/day 
-weather 
-vessel conditions 
- cargo type/quantity 
- size of vessel 
- configuration 
-other 
- other vessel(s) 
- other pressures 
4. The Organization of the Vessel Team 
- bridge-watch composition/background 
- watch officer(s) 
- wheelsman 
-observers 
- engineroom team composition/background 
- nature of past practice 
- "open/closed" system of relationships 
- "respect" expected/given 
- "vertical/horizontal" system of relationships 
5. The Technology/Equipment in Use 
- bridge equipment operating 
- bridge equipment not operating 
- engine equipment not operating (I presume that the Master would 
only know of "failures" not of normal operations in the engineroom.) 
6. The Situation Itself ("Near-miss or close-call") 
- tell me what happened 
-forward chronology (time sequence from start to finish) 
-backward chronology (the event, back to start) 
- the recognition of the potential collision (forward and/or backward) 
- actions taken/not taken 
-by Master 
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' 
- by'others 
7. Personal Conclusions 
- "rules~· of sailing 
-what works 
.. what ·doesn't work 
-when 
-why 
- prevention in the future 
. - lesson 'to "teach'' others 
8. Why did this stay a near-miss and not become and. accident? 
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